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Abstract 
 
Although a little known fact, Spanish diplomats helped save many of their own Sephardic 
(Spanish) Jews during World War Two.  Three Spanish diplomats in three different locales – 
Bernardo Rolland in Paris, Sebastián Romero Radigales in Greece, and Julio Palencia in 
Bulgaria – made surprising and systematic efforts to save the Sephardim from the Nazis.  Why 
was Spain, a fascist country and German ally, helpful to Jews during the war?  This question lies 
at the heart of my investigation, and this paper will suggest some possible reasons for this 
historical conundrum.  
 
Spain’s expulsion of the Jews in 1492 provides a historical locus from which to consider several 
implications that emerge closer to WWII. The fact of individual diplomats acting on their own is 
equally important in speculating about possible reasons for inconsistent application of Spanish 
government policy. The behavior of these diplomats probably reflected considerations of modern 
Spanish national identity, which is intertwined with Spanish Jewry.  Furthermore, the majority of 
diplomats came from the higher echelons of society who had class, cultural, and educational 
affinities with the Sephardim, creating empathy, which may account for the life-saving actions.  
The fact that Franco did not establish a clear agenda for his diplomats or an institutionalized 
training system prior to 1942 accounts for the flexibility granted to these diplomats, which they, 
in turn, used to save many Sephardim. The 1942 institutionalization of the diplomatic corps was 
Franco’s attempt to correct this problem and to create a cohort of diplomats that was an 
extension of his regime with the same ideological leanings.  
 
My primary source research in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Spain helps to 
shed light on this historical puzzle, itself a reminder of the importance of recognizing 
contingency and competing interests in historiography.  
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Introduction 
 
Mireille’s Vignette 
“What do you think was in this box?” the graying elderly woman sitting across from me 
asks, a hint of amusement flashing in her inquisitive brown eyes. She leans towards me from 
across the table, revealing a small, slightly rusting tin (see figure 1). I discern some sort of 
symmetrical pattern weaving its way across the top of the tin, two foreign words, indecipherable 
to me, appear both above and below the design.  
Mireille, noticing that I have mentally left the apartment on a trip entirely within the 
recesses of my memory, draws me back to reality by prompting me further. “A few people say 
tobacco. Maybe originally, my father was smoker. But here we are on the road and we don’t 
know if we’ll ever come back. Most likely not. And my mother has one small suitcase. What 
would a family of four take on a journey for an uncertain number of days? Money? No we 
weren’t rich, we didn’t have much money. Photographs? Although I loved my family that wasn’t 
essential survival stuff.” Noting my blank face, she answers her own question –  “This was my 
mother’s sewing kit so she kept her needles and threads to replace buttons and holes and darn 
socks.” I am profoundly struck by the story of this tin and how it seems to serve as the perfect 
metaphor of Mireille’s life. Just as this tin was reutilized for different purposes, reappropriated as 
an object – its origins occluded, its location shifted, its language redefined – so too was Mireille 
9	  
labeled as a Jew, a Polish Jew, a French Jew, forced to cross numerous borders, unsure of her 
identity and place.  Mireille’s life on the run, the very pattern of her life, seemed to be 
completely symbolized by this curious tin.  
Figure 1: Tobacco tin. Source: my personal picture.  
She outlines of her family’s escape, constructing her narrative not only out of her own 
direct memories but also from what her parents told her. She first describes her childhood life of 
being part of poor immigrant family in France that had moved to find a better life outside of 
impoverished and wildly anti-Semitic Poland. The kindness of strangers is a central theme to the 
10	  
story she tells me, and she highlights the kind officer who permitted her solider-father to leave 
his post upon France’s imminent surrender to the Germans due to the danger he and his Jewish 
family faced in light of capitulation. She describes her family’s luck once again, and how they 
caught the “last train from Paris” before the surrender, the name of her short story she wrote on 
this topic.  
Mireille’s family rented a truck and drove towards the Pyrenees and after some time 
arrived in the small city of Perpignan, which is about 100 kilometers from the Spanish border. 
Once in Spain her family traveled first to Barcelona. It is important to note that Mireille’s family, 
and all other Jews (including those of Spanish nationality) were deemed “in transit” and given 
only thirty days to use Spain as a means of transit to another, more permanent destination.  Thus, 
from Barcelona Mireille’s family traveled to Lisbon, Portugal, which marked the end of their 
journey by land. Mireille’s saga continued by sea, and her family embarked on a Greek merchant 
steamer that was part of a convoy. After three weeks of dodging U-boats and torpedoes across 
the Atlantic, in somewhat of a miracle, Mireille’s family arrived in America on August 11, 1940 
(see figure 2).    
In terms of visas and documentation, Mireille’s father’s American family helped her 
family to get papers along before World War Two broke out. Because of the system of extremely 
limited Polish immigration to the United States, Mireille and her sister were registered as part of 
11	  
the French quota (they had been declared French nationals at birth). Her father, Polish by birth, 
was issued a Nansen passport. These passports, named after the Norwegian diplomat in the 
League of Nations, were issued to Russians seeking to escape the Reds/Bolshevism. HIAS1 
(Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society) processed their papers and housed them upon their arrival to 
New York, where Mireille has lived ever since. 
         
Figure 2: Escape route to Spain of Mireille’s family. Source: my personal picture.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) was founded in 1881 to help ease the exodus of Jewish emigrants from 
Russia. HIAS assists Jews and other groups of people whose lives and freedom are believed to be at risk to relocate. 
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Mireille finishes her story and after a few moments, I choose to break the silence.  “So 
why Spain?” She hesitates, “we’re allowed to travel through Spain. I never asked my father why 
Spain and not Switzerland. It never occurred to me to ask…” She pauses, I relish the fact that my 
question makes her think, think more about something that she has thought about constantly for 
her entire life. She continues on, more matter of fact now, “but we’re not allowed to stay in 
Spain.  We’re in transit Jews. Franco apparently accepted a great deal of money from refugees in 
transit. We are part of many thousands who transferred through Spain. We get into Portugal…the 
arrangements were made that we join a convoy on a Greek freighter and we traveled three weeks 
across the north Atlantic during which the submarine bombings which is why we were part of a 
convoy.” 
Mireille’s experience is not just remarkable for her tale of fortunate circumstances nor is 
it an anomaly in the case of other Jews, French or otherwise, in mid-twentieth century Europe. 
Spain retained binding ties with its own Spanish Jews, the Sephardim. Sephardim, which literally 
means “people of Spain,” comes from the Hebrew word Sefarad (דַרָפְס), which is a biblical 
location. The word Sefarad appears in the biblical book of Obadiah and has meant “Spain” since 
the Middle Ages.2 The names of France and Spain in Hebrew are both misnomers that come 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2John Efron, Joshua Holo, Mattjias Lehmann, Steven Weitzman, The Jews, A History (Saddlebrook, NJ: Pearson 
Prentice Hall, 2009), 178.  
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from the extension of earlier prophecies made in the Bible. These strange names come from a 
prophecy in Amos, chapter nine in which a promise is made about redemption and the return of 
the Jewish Diaspora. Around the ninth century, the Jews of Spain interpreted these prophecies to 
mean the return of the Jewish Diaspora to Spain. This term was used to describe Jews originating 
from the Iberian Peninsula, namely Spain and Portugal. The Ashkenazi3 Jews are a second 
category of Jews that differ from the Sephardim. These two types of Jews have distinctive 
liturgic and religious-legal traditions and are quite different from each other.4 
Today in 2013, an estimated 250,000 Sephardic Jews exist and some still speak a form of 
Ladino, an archaic Jewish Spanish dialect that permits the Sephardim to communicate with 
Spanish speakers in Mexico, Columbia, Argentina, and Chile without difficulty.5 The most 
numerous Sephardic community resides in Israel and many Sephardim still live in Turkey.6  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The term Ashekanz appears in the bible books of Genesis, Chronicles, and Jeremiah. Specifically Ashkenazi comes 
from the biblical figure of Ashkenaz, son of Yefet (Genesis 10). This terminology results from the effort to find a 
biblical reference to the lands newly inhabited by Jews; geography depicted in Genesis was identified with parts of 
Europe. The notion of genealogy acquired special resonance in the late Middle Ages when migration from Germany 
to the East occurred and was applied especially to the Rhineland: Efron, The Jews, 178. 
4 Efron, The Jews, A History,  178.  
5 Joseph Perez, Los Judíos en España (Madrid, España: Marcial Pons Historia, 2005), 279. 
6 Miguel Ángel Nieto,  El Último Sefardí, el legado oral de los judíos expulsados de España en  
1492 (Madrid, España: Calamar Edición, 2003), 10.  
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Many of these Sephardic communities only assimilated into larger society over the course of the 
last generation, which demonstrates their lasting ties and commitment to their Spanish culture.  
However, Mireille, an Ashkenazi rather than Sephardic Jew, had no ties to Spain. Yet she 
was permitted to pass through to receive refuge. It is this aspect of Mireille’s background, her 
Ashkenazi or Eastern European rather than Spanish roots that makes her story not only 
extraordinary but also illustrative of a trend of Spain’s extension of aid to the Jews. The 
Francoist right wing held some negative stereotypes of the Jews such as the belief that the Jews 
had disproportionate international clout and that the Jews were in control of the Allies. But the 
vicious anti-Semitic ideology that permeated Central Europe in the twentieth century, which 
during the late eighteenth was liberal in granting the Jews citizenship, never took hold in Spain.  
Mireille’s story demonstrates a central theme to the historical circumstances of World 
War Two –  one of irony. My thesis concentrates on the examples of three Spanish diplomats and 
their efforts to help Sephardic Jews in World War Two escape Nazi-controlled territory by 
issuing them visas to travel from their homes through Spain to safe territory. In the words of 
Diego Carcedo, a contemporary scholar on the subject, “in different capitals, other Spanish 
diplomats, although not all of them, jumped over strictly established rules and acted flexibly by 
taking actions outside of their responsibility such as issuing visas and letters of nationality when 
15	  
they saw any possibility to do so.”7  Remarkably, considering that they officially represented a 
nation friendly to Germany, many Spanish diplomats actively attempted to protect Spanish and 
non-Spanish Jews both in and outside of their domain.  
Bernardo Rolland, the Spanish Consul General in Paris, used his jurisdiction to grant 
visas to many Sephardim and evacuate them from France.  Rolland also fought the Statutes des 
Juifs, adopted in Vichy France in 1940-41. This set of laws discriminated in various ways against 
French Jews in an effort to differentiate them from the rest of the French populace. Rolland’s 
efforts succeeded in 1942 when it became impossible for Vichy authorities to confiscate the 
Sephardim’s property. Near the French-Spanish border, Spanish diplomats in France ignored the 
instructions of the Spanish government in Madrid with respect to the Sephardim under their 
domain.  Although Germany coerced Franco into closing the French-Spanish border for a period 
of time towards the end of 1942, there are many cases of visas being issued for Spanish Jews 
attempting to cross this border.  Moreover, numerous complaints were filed over what was 
deemed diplomatic insubordination. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7En diferentes capitales, otros diplomáticos españoles, aunque por supuesto no todos, se saltaban las normas mas 
estrictas y flexibilizaban su actitud mas allá de sus competencias concediendo visados y cartas de nacionalidad 
cuando veían alguna posibilidad de hacerlo (pg. 164). All English translations in this paper are by the author from 
original Spanish. 
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At a greater geographical distance from Spain, it was easier for Spanish diplomats to 
push the limits of the Franco regime’s authority.  Sebastián Romero de Radigales, the Spanish 
Consul General in Greece, took personal measures to save 500-600 Sephardim. Radigales 
proposed numerous and innovative repatriation plans to Madrid, which demonstrated his 
concerted efforts to save the Spanish Jews in any way possible. One such plan included 
providing entry visas for Spanish Jews to either Spain or Morocco.8  He also petitioned the 
Spanish government for help on behalf of the Sephardim in Salonika (the largest Jewish 
community in Greece), and successfully persuaded Germany to agree to allow repatriation of 
these Jews to Spain.  Franco’s regime failed to follow through and save all of these Jews at the 
very last moment, but that slippage was out of Radigales’ control.  
The case of Julio Palencia, Minister of the Spanish Embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria, is 
particularly intriguing.  His strong pro-Jewish sentiments earned him the nickname “the well 
known friend of the Jews” in German correspondence.9  Palencia, who had established contact 
with the Sephardic community of Bulgaria prior to these measures, took the approach that “in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The Spanish protectorate of Morocco was the area of Morocco under colonial rule by the Spanish empire. This 
protectorate was established by the Treaty of Fez in 1912 and ended in 1956, when both France and Spain 
recognized Moroccan independence. During World War Two, many Spanish bureaucrats suggested sending 
Sephardim to this protectorate, some successfully and others not: see Haim Avni, Spain, The Jews, and Franco 
(Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1974), 150. 
9 Chaim U. Lipschitz, Franco, Spain, the Jews, and the Holocaust (New York, NY: Ktay Publishing House, 1984), 
66.  
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Spain citizens of different categories classified for ethnic or religious reasons do not exist”10 and 
considered the Sephardim to have special ties to Spain.11  There are many examples of Palencia 
appealing to the Spanish government for humanitarian reasons on behalf of the Jews.  Most 
notably, Palencia surprised even his diplomatic colleagues by adopting the imperiled children of 
a Sephardic.  By doing so, Palencia took an extreme risk and stuck his neck out past the point of 
impunity; this action proved too much for the foreign ministry in Madrid and resulted in his 
removal from his diplomatic post.  
In these three cases, Spanish diplomats made repeated and systematic efforts to save 
Sephardic Jews from the Nazis.  And they were not the only ones who acted in such ways.  
Estimates vary widely regarding the number of Jews saved by Spanish efforts.  Yad Vashem, 
Israel’s World Center for Holocaust Research, conservatively estimates 30,000 Sephardim saved 
by Spain, while U.S. congressmen Abraham J. Multer, a U.S. congressman from New York from 
1947-77 with a strong interest in Jewish affairs, approximates the number at closer to 60,000.12  
Historians Haim Avni and Bernd Rother have variously estimated the number of Jews escaping 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 “La condición de raza o de religión de estas personas no cuenta en nuestra legislación nacional.” : Fedérico Ysart. 
España y los judíos en la segunda guerra mundial: testimonio de actualidad 
(Barcelona, Spain: Dopesa, 1973) 129. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Lipschitz, Franco, Spain, the Jews, and the Holocaust, 142.  
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over the Pyrenees, the mountainous border between France and Spain; Avni suggests 23,000, 
while Rother puts the number between 20,000-35,000.13  
Given the widespread nature of these diplomatic interventions, more systematic 
explanations are called for, even if they can only be suggested rather than definitely shown.  
These actions represent a methodical rescue effort, which reflects not merely an individual moral 
stance, but rather something influenced by a national and cultural rationale connected with the 
Spanish identity. This is particularly intriguing because members of an international diplomatic 
community are often more likely to avoid strong action and upsetting the fine balance of things.  
 The way in which nationalism occurred within Spain as well as the fact that Sephardic 
Jewish communities abroad were comprised of individuals of Spanish origin may have 
contributed to the development of this paradigm. Furthermore, the distinction between Franco 
and his diplomats must be emphasized.  Franco, on the one hand, is somewhat of a human riddle. 
He was on record as having made a number of anti-Semitic comments and yet these remarks 
were never translated in to actual policies. Whatever stereotypes Spaniards held about the Jews, 
Franco’s regime never instituted a consistent racial and anti-Semitic policy. In a time where no 
country in Europe wanted to claim its Jews, Spain proclaimed the Jews Spaniards and took 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13Josep Calvet. Las montañas de la libertad: El paso de refugiados por los pirineos durante la  
segunda guerra mundial 1939-1944 (Madrid, Spain: Alianza Editorial, 2008), 137.  
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partial accountability for them. Instead, it is clear that during much of the time of these 
diplomats’ pro-Sephardic activity, there was a vacuum of centralized leadership and instructions 
which allowed Spanish diplomats to take actions without the full consent of Franco but, also for 
the most part, with impunity.  The types of violations committed by these diplomats against 
Spanish orders demonstrate the bounds of power within a loose and far-flung bureaucratic 
system, operating with limited communications technology.  Embassy letters and other official 
documents illustrate just how far a Spanish diplomat could go before facing repercussions. These 
diplomats used euphemisms and feigned misunderstandings.  They also skirted issues and 
pretended to be compliant with official Spanish policy while often acting directly in opposition 
to the Spanish government’s demands. 
Why was the Spanish government helpful to Jews on any level during World War Two?   
How strange it is that those countries with Catholic cultures, such as Italy, which continued to 
entertain a set of anti-Jewish attitudes failed to develop modern racial anti-Semitism.  The Jews 
of Europe actually survived World War Two the longest in fascist regimes. Part of the reason for 
this was the fact that Jews are a testament to Christian truths and are inextricably linked to the 
history of Christianity; Judaism and the Old Testament are the grounds for the entire Christian 
religion. This is the major different between the majority of fascist regimes and National 
20	  
Socialism; National Socialism sought to cut this historic yet problematic relationship. So, while 
Germany laid claim to a racial ideology, Spain never quite did.  
Spain’s cultural and historical ties with its Sephardim played a vital role in shaping its 
attitude towards the Jews. While Spain retained a set of Catholic stereotypes about the Jews, it 
remained largely impervious to the racialization of Jews seen in the majority of other countries in 
Europe during this time period. Paradoxically, the descendants of the Jews who were once forced 
out of Spain by the Edict of Expulsion of 1492 specifically received protection from Spanish 
diplomats during the Holocaust era.   
It’s important to recognize just how surprising this activity was, considering that Franco’s 
Spain, along with another fascist government, Mussolini’s Italy, were very closely associated 
with Hitler’s Germany.  It is fascinating to consider how the two fascist pariahs of the western 
world which were most closely associated with Nazi Germany–Italy and Spain–made some of 
the greatest efforts to save their own Jews.  This realization truly turns the conventional notion of 
twentieth century Western Europe on its head.  I’d like to explore some possible reasons for this 
historical conundrum.  One possibility: it might be influenced by modern Spanish national 
identity, which is intertwined with Spanish Jewry. Perhaps Spanish diplomats felt a personal 
sense of shame regarding Spain’s Expulsion of the Jews in 1492 as representatives abroad of a 
country with a very problematic and shameful history. Due to their country’s indefensible action 
21	  
in the past, maybe they hoped to do their part to avoid another wrongdoing to these Spanish Jews 
in modernity, when they now had the power to do so.   
In this way, the Jews seemingly became symbols of Spanish national pride and a 
symbolic people in terms of power plays with Germany. This symbolism is linked to a variety of 
ideas, one of which is the Jews as a symbol of self-making and self-fashioning similar to 
Franco’s ideology surrounding the self-fashioning of his own unique and exceptional regime. 
Thus, Spanish nationalism was a useful tool used by diplomats to push their agendas and assert 
their right to the save the Sephardim. 
Archival documents and secondary source literature give the impression that these 
diplomats from a nationalist, fascist state held the idea that Spanish fascism had its own 
ideologies independent of the national socialism of Nazi Germany. Spanish diplomats were 
greatly impacted by Spanish nationalism, specifically their professional role in protecting 
Spanish subjects and citizens. This motivated their life-saving actions.  While fascists are often 
lumped in the same conglomerate, both Spain and Italy’s fascisms differed drastically from 
Germany’s National Socialism form of fascism. One of the most important ideological 
differences lay in Franco’s ambivalent attitude towards the Jews and the opportunistic way in 
which he used them. For Franco, the Jews were not a major focus. Economic problems plagued 
Spain and this agenda took precedence over most everything else. This was, of course, 
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compounded by the fact that the Spaniards did not possess a vicious form of anti-Semitism to 
play on as the Nazis did. Connected to this idea is the fact that it is hard to have a “Jewish 
problem” in a country that has virtually no Jews. 
 
Historiography 
 Numerous scholars have tirelessly studied the topic of Spanish aid to the Jews during 
World War Two and have offered a wide range of opinions, ideas, and insights. The 
chronological trend in these writings reveals a pattern: the earlier works, written in the 1970s, 
praise Franco’s Spain and attempt to reveal a new side of Spain to the rest of the world.  For 
instance, both Chaim Lipchitz (Franco, Spain, the Jews, and the Holocaust, 1984), an American 
rabbi, and Fedérico Ysart (España y los judíos en la segunda guerra mundial: testimonio de 
actualidad, 1973), present Franco’s regime in a positive fashion. While Lipchitz blames Spain’s 
severe economic crisis for limiting Franco’s rescue activities, Ysart goes so far as to assert that 
“the name of Spain is one of the few lights that shines in the long and dark of night which the 
Jewish community lived through during the tragic years of Nazism.”14 These notions went 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14“El nombre de España es una de las poquísimas luces que brillan en la larga y oscura noche que vivió el pueblo 
judío durante los trágicos años del nazismo” (pg. 10).  
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against the generally held conception of Spain as a pro-Axis authoritarian regime held by both 
Israel and the Western world following World War Two. 
 Later works, written in eras following the death of Franco and the opening of 
governmental archives, offer a harsher portrayal of Franco’s actions and typically argue that 
Franco was motivated by self-interest and could have helped Jewish refugees more. Haim Avni 
(Spain, The Jews, and Franco, 1974) calls into question the notion that the Franco regime did 
everything in its power to save the Jews. Later, in 2005 German Bernd Rother (Franco y el 
Holocausto) makes clear that the Franco regime could have done much more to aid Jewish 
refugees. Isabel Rohr (The Spanish right and the Jews, 1989-1945: anti-Semitism and 
opportunism, 2007) extends this argument with a more direct nuance; the general consensus is 
that Franco acted opportunistically in its interactions with the Jews.  
The two most recent books written about this subject by Spaniards themselves offer the 
most negative presentation of Franco’s regime while elevating the work of Spanish diplomats. 
These works written by Eduardo Martín de de Pozuelo (El Franquismo, Cómplice Del 
Holocausto y otros episodios desconocidos de la dictadura, 2012) and Diego Carcedo (Entre 
bestias y héroes: Los Españoles que plantaron cara al Holocausto, 2011) both use hidden and 
destroyed documents to argue that Franco was complicit in the Holocaust and that any altruistic 
aid offered to Jews by Spanish diplomats was done without Spain’s genuine support. 
24	  
My thesis raises a question not been raised before, asking why the subject of systematic 
Spanish diplomatic aid has not been broached. While definitive answers cannot be provided by 
this thesis alone, these questions surrounding this historical phenomenon will never be answered 
without presenting and examining potential reasons for this diplomatic aid.    
 
Central Research Questions 
Due to the large gaps in the historiography of my subject, my research raises numerous 
questions that my archival and secondary research attempts to answer. Why did the Spanish 
suddenly come to view the Sephardim as Spaniards? Why did Spanish diplomats go out of their 
way to help these Jews outside of Spain’s borders? What different levels within the Spanish state 
apparatus allowed for Spanish diplomats to save Jews outside of Spain’s borders in spite of 
Franco’s ambivalence? Why did numerous Spanish diplomats go out of their way to allow Jews 
to reach safety by passing through Spain? If this were the case of one diplomat, the story would 
be different. However, a series of diplomats with a fairly consistent policy—to help the Jews—
cannot be ignored. The incredible resourcefulness demonstrated by these diplomats represents a 
clear pattern. What conditions led a string of varying diplomats to sympathize with the plight of 
the Jews and invoke the Sephardim’s Spanish heritage to save them? And why did these 
diplomats receive such little recognition post World War Two, particularly by Israel and Yad 
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Vashem?15  
My research in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Madrid and the Central 
Archives of the Administration in Alcala de Henares examined letters between Spanish 
diplomats and the Franco’s regime to study their correspondence. This primary source archival 
research, in conjunction with secondary sources, forms the basis for my thesis. 
 
Overview of Thesis 
The following chapters examine the cases of the three mentioned Spanish diplomats and 
explore reasons for the Spanish bureaucratic aid granted to the Sephardim during World War 
Two. In Chapter One, “The Ambiguous Legacy,” I explore the Sephardic Diaspora and its 
legacies in Spain. Spain’s expulsion of the Jews in 1492 provides a historical locus from which 
to consider several implications that emerge closer to World War Two.  Spain’s reevaluation of 
the Expulsion following a series of Spanish crises and Spain’s bid for modernity and 
Enlightenment through Jewish Emancipation and the granting of citizenship to its Sephardim in 
1924 helps to explain this phenomenon. In Chapter Two, “Like a Light Through Glass,” I will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 As the Jewish people’s living memorial to the Holocaust, Yad Vashem safeguards the memory of the past and 
imparts meaning for future generations. Established in 1953, as the world center for documentation, research, 
education and commemoration of the Holocaust, Yad Vashem is today a dynamic and vital place of 
intergenerational and international encounter. Quote from Yad Vashem website, www.yadvashem.org. 
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discuss Franco’s complex and opportunistic relationship with the Sephardim, which will help to 
differentiate between the Franco regime and the humanitarian work of individual Spanish 
diplomats during World War Two. Additionally, I will delineate the historical conditions 
provided by the Spanish Civil War and World War Two in Spain. I will also delve into the 
Spanish immigration policy that allowed for the Sephardim to pass through Spain and onto safe 
destination as well as the history of the Spanish bureaucratic structure.  
 In Chapter Three, I will discuss Bernardo Rolland and his role as Consul General in 
Paris. The fact that Rolland operated at a close geographical proximity to Spain (France and 
Spain share a border) will be highlighted and juxtaposed with diplomats operating at a further 
distance from the Franco regime. I will also discuss Spanish border control as well as Rolland’s 
role in issuing transit visas and protecting Sephardic property as an extension of Spanish 
property. Finally, writings and descriptions by American diplomats regarding diplomatic culture 
and responsibility will be used to help explain the actions taken by Spanish diplomats.  
In Chapters Four and Five, the actions of Spanish diplomats Radigales in Greece and 
Palencia in Bulgaria will be discussed as well as the greater ease of pushing the bounds of 
Franco’s authority at a greater geographical distance from Spain. The techniques used by 
Spanish diplomats to skirt the Spanish regime’s authority as well as the nature of the 
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bureaucratic structure will be discussed to help explain the fact that these Spanish diplomats had 
the power to act in opposition to the Franco regime without facing major repercussions.  
Finally, the Conclusion will focus on remembering the heroes of the Holocaust as well as 
the fact that recognition is often contingent on diplomatic relations. Specifically, the lack of 
Spanish-Israeli diplomatic relations following World War Two played a role in hindering the 
recognition of Spanish diplomats by Yad Vashem. I will touch on the issue of modern-day 
relations between the Sephardim and Spain, the issue of citizenship that has recently manifested 
itself again, and the significance of Spanish diplomatic aid during World War Two. 
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Chapter 1: The Ambiguous Legacy 
 
Historical Background of Sephardim in Spain: The Expulsion of 1492 and the Diaspora 
 Spain has a complex relationship with the Sephardim, which greatly influenced the 
attitudes and politics of the Franco regime during the Second World War. The year 1492 marked 
a pivotal moment in history for a number of peoples, cultures, and places. 1492 is a fraught and 
notorious year in Spanish history:  obviously associated with growth of the Spanish Empire and 
voyages of exploration, it is also the year in which the “Catholic Kings” (Reyes Católicos as they 
are called in Spain),16 Isabelle and Ferdinand, issued an edict that the Jews from Spain and thus, 
with the stroke of a pen, destroyed the largest and most distinguished Jewish settlement in 
Europe.   
In 1480 the Catholic Kings established the Inquisition, an organization centered around 
regulating the catholic faith and to ensure the orthodoxy of the Spanish conversos, or previous 
Spanish Jews who had converted to Catholicism.17 The Inquisition was a direct result of two 
factors. The first was the massive conversions of Jews to Catholicism in the fifteenth century as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The Catholic Kings is the joint title used to describe Queen Isabella I of Castile and King Ferdinand II of Aragon. 
The title of "Catholic King and Queen" was given to them by Pope Alexander VI in 1496 for supporting Catholic 
dogmas within their realms. 
17 Haim Beinart, Los Judíos en España (Madrid, España: Editorial MAPRE, 1992), 210. 
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means to avoid intolerance and acts of violence.18 Many Jews renounced the religion of their 
forefathers, usually against their will, with the hopes that they would have a better life in Spain 
as part of the accepted, majority religion. Yet, although considered official Christians, many of 
these conversos never actually abandoned their ancestral faith and continued to practice their 
religion in secret, a practice called “crypto-Judaism,” at great personal risk. This practice was 
criminalized in Christianity due to its emphasis on orthodoxy, or the importance of purity of 
belief, rather than orthopraxy, the importance of ritual and tradition emphasized in Judaism.  
 The second factor that contributed to the Inquisition was a trip that Ferdinand and Isabel 
took to Seville in 1477. On this trip, they learned of the situation regarding crypto-Judaism in 
which many of the conversos “remained under the influence of their ex-correligionists, the Jews, 
despite their baptism.”19 Many examples existed of apparent conversos who continued to pray in 
Hebrew and eat meat on days the church prohibited it. This discovery prompted the Catholic 
Kings to search for a way to resolve these acts of betrayal that the “infidels” made against their 
religion.  
 After a period of time with limited success, Ferdinand, Isabelle, and other church officials 
felt that the Inquisition was not a foolproof means of safeguarding the Catholic faith despite the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Perez, Los Judíos en España, 149.  
19 “Los conversos seguían estando bajo la influencia de sus ex-correligionarios judíos a pesar de su bautismo”: 
Beinart, Los Judíos en España, 197.  
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system of tribunal justice and punishment established by the Inquisition.  As a result, on March 
31, 1492 Ferdinand and Isabel signed the Edict of Expulsion, expelling the Jews and Muslims 
from Spain.20 One factor that influenced the Expulsion was the ideology that the Catholic Kings 
were restoring Spain to the one true faith. Spain was not unique in this approach; part of the 
process of nation state building was premised upon the idea of having a religiously unified 
country. Spain took this idea one step further by issuing in the Edict of Expulsion. In doing this, 
Spain effectively rid itself of Jews until the modern day. Even by the twentieth century, very few 
Jews had returned to Spain, which is a factor that influenced Franco’s policy to allow the 
Sephardim to return to Spain and pass through his country during World War Two. Additionally, 
the Expulsion resulted in a unique history of Spain vis-à-vis the Jews, for this early modern 
Expulsion arguably led to a sense of national guilt that influenced the country for centuries. 
Aside from Jews, the Muslims represented another common enemy against which Spain 
had to protect itself in the late fifteenth century. In 711, the Muslim Moors from North Africa 
began their conquest of the Iberian Peninsula successfully crossing the Strait of Gibraltar and 
establishing their domain over Spain. Subsequently, Islamic rule over Spain lasted hundreds of 
years and was especially pronounced in Andalucía, the south of Spain. The Muslims greatly 
impacted Spanish society and culture: Arabic had a strong lexical influence on the Spanish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Beinart, Los Judíos en España, 223.  
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language and few thousand Spanish words have their roots in Arabic. The profound influence of 
the Muslims on Spain contributed to a sense of paranoia and the desire officially to rid Spain of 
dangerous infidels:  the Jews and the Muslims.  
Another factor that influenced the Expulsion was the ideology that by expelling the Jews, 
the Catholic monarchs were showing their pride in their Catholic titles, and religious zeal in a 
messianic environment. Ferdinand was not alone in his fifteenth century monarchy-building 
endeavor. Religious conformity was part of the monarchy building process, and the glory of any 
Christians King was to have a religiously unified country. Additionally, it is possible that the 
Isabella and Ferdinand were trying with the Catholic king of France to be the “most Catholic.”21 
Therefore, political factors played a role in this decision along with religious ones. Furthermore, 
the Catholic kings hoped to inspire a national religious unity within a totally Christian nation to 
reinforce a cohesive national identity.22   
Although there are no exact numbers, it is believed that more than 100,000 Sephardic  
Jews were forced from their homeland.23  The movement of Sephardim outside of Spain to other 
parts of the world in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, or the Sephardic Diaspora,24 brought 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 J. H. Elliot, España y Su Mundo, 1500-1700 (Madrid, España: Yale University, 1989), 207. 
22 Perez, Los Judíos en España, 208. 
 23 Nieto, El Último Sefardí, 9. 
24 Diaspora has its roots in Greek, meaning "scattering” or “dispersion.”  The Jewish people have suffered several 
Diasporas in addition to their Expulsion from Spain such as the Babylonian Exile and the destruction of the Second 
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these Jews to three principal zones – Portugal and North Africa, northern Europe, and the 
Ottoman Empire.25 Some Sephardim traveled by land, going to countries such as Portugal and 
France. Others traveled by sea, arriving in places such as the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and 
England.26 Some went to Muslim territories such as Morocco and the Ottoman Empire (see 
figure 3).27 The Sephardic expulsion deeply impacted Spanish collective memory for years to 
come and can account for the context in which both Franco’s government and the rogue 
diplomats acted during World War Two.28  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Temple.  The Second Temple was an important Jewish Holy Temple that stood on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem 
between 516 BCE and 70 CE. It replaced the First Temple, which was destroyed in 586 BCE, when the Jewish 
nation was exiled to Babylon. 
 25María Antonia Bravo,  Diaspora Sefardí (Madrid, España:  Editorial MAPFRE, 1992), 33.  
26 Yosef Kaplan, Judíos nuevos en AMSTERDAM- Estudio sobre la historia social e intelectual del judaísmo sefardí 
en el siglo XVII (Barcelona, Spain: Gedisma Editorial, 1996), 27.  
27 Perez, Los Judíos en España, 269. 
28 Bravo, Diáspora Sefardí, 33.  
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Figure 3: Map showing Sephardic Diaspora. Source: www.worldreligions.psu.edu  
   
Ultimately, the exile of the Sephardim was a traumatic and difficult experience, often 
resulting in an identity crisis and a redefinition of the Jewish identity.29 Among Jewish 
individuals who converted to Christianity, an enormous amount of confusion ensued and often 
times a hybrid theology developed in which individuals thought of themselves as both Jews and 
Christians. For those Jews who remained faithful to Judaism, the Diaspora took them to foreign 
lands where they had to renegotiate the very idea of what it meant to be Jewish. At the same 
time, however, many Sephardim continued to remain proud of their Spanish roots and 
maintained the Spanish language and literature with enthusiasm.  These Spanish Jews were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Kaplan, Judíos nuevos en AMSTERDAM, 27. 
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saddened by their expulsion from their Fatherland as is demonstrated in a poem by a Spanish 
Rabbi, Abraham Capón residing in the Ottoman Empire (modern day Turkey).30 In this poem, 
Capón invokes strong feelings of emotion from the ties he has with his homeland. He refers to 
Spain as his querida and país glorioso, his “dear and glorious country,” and refers to the Spanish 
language as a dulce lenguaje, “sweet language,” that he will never forget. He vows to never stop 
loving his fatherland and describes the expulsion as atormentado or “tormented.”  More than 
anything else, this poem demonstrates the involuntary and painful nature of the Expulsion as 
well as the Sephardic classification of identity as equally Spanish and Jewish.  
Following this painful Expulsion, the Sephardim dispersed throughout the world in what 
is known as the Sephardic Diaspora. Through their dispersal, the Sephardim actually extended 
their reach as a transnational ethnic and religious community. These ties helped the Sephardim 
develop an international business community. Clear examples of this solidarity are the Sephardic 
communities of Amsterdam and the Ottoman Empire, places where some Sephardim achieved 
great financial success.31  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 A ti España bien querida, nosotros madre te llamamos, y mientras dure nuestra vida, tu dulce lengua no dejamos 
aunque tú nos desterraste, como madrastra de tu seno, no dejamos de amarte, como santísimo terreno, en que 
dejaron nuestros padres, a sus parientes enterrados, y a las semillas de millares, de atormentados y quemados, por ti 
conservamos, amor filial, país glorioso, por consiguiente te mandamos, nuestro saludo caluroso: Nieto, El Último 
Sefardí, 23-24.  
31 Perez, Los Judíos en España, 260. 
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Within Spain, the expulsion of the Sephardim represented a reconquest, as in 
reconquering of Spain by the Catholics from the “infidels.”  While the associations of the 
Sephardic diaspora were initially positive, it later began to mark Spain in unwelcome ways in an 
international context. 
 
Jewish Emancipation 
Spain’s backwardness beginning in the seventeenth century, as indicated by the 
Expulsion of the Sephardic Jews, was further compounded by the lack of Jewish Emancipation 
in Spain in the eighteenth century. While the modern day Jewish community regards its two 
central historical traumas as the destruction of the second temple  and the Holocaust, the greatest 
tragedy to befall Jews within a singular country was the Expulsion from Spain in 1492.  During 
the era of the Expulsion, Spain was at the foreground in the development of anti-Jewish attitudes 
and held a “semi-racial” conception of the Jews. The very idea of “purity of the blood” or 
limpieza de sangre,32 along with the belief that Jewish converts to Catholicism were not real 
Spaniards and that their conversion was not genuine, illustrates this racial ideology. This racial 
conception of Jews stemmed from the fear of conversos Judaizing, or imposing secretly held 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 “Purity of the Blood”- Referred to those who were considered pure "Old Christians,” without Muslim or Jewish 
ancestors. This discredited conversos, or Spanish Jews who converted to Christianity, and kept them from being 
considered true Christians on a racial basis.  
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Jewish beliefs, on the greater Christian population through their infiltration of the Church. The 
Spanish Inquisition took as one of its main purposes the eradication of Judaizing influences in 
Spain.  
As the Inquisition continued within Spain into nineteenth century, Jewish Emancipation 
took place throughout the rest of Europe. As early as 1782, Austrian emperor Joseph II issued the 
Edict of Toleration to “make the Jewish nation useful and serviceable to the State mainly through 
better education and enlightenment of its youth…”33 In 1789, the French Revolution wrought 
changes in society that paved the way for Jewish emancipation and citizenship. In fact, Napoleon 
Bonaparte emancipated the Jews in every location French armies successfully conquered.34 In 
England, while no formal emancipation occurred, the Jews attained equal rights by the 1830s.35 
Emancipation came later to Germany, which in 1871 finally emancipated its Jews with the 
underlying condition that they would assimilate into society at large.36 Similarly, in 1869 the 
Ottoman Empire officially emancipated its Jewish population. Thus, “by 1871 most of central, 
southern, and Western European; Ottoman; and Anglo Jewries had been legally emancipated.”37 
Meanwhile, the Spanish Inquisition lasted into the 19th century; while French Jews gained 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Efron, The Jews, A History, 243.  
34 Ibid., 245.  
35 Ibid., 248.  
36 Ibid., 252. 
37 Ibid., 253.  
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citizenship as early as 1791, the few Jews remaining in Spain continued to be burned at the 
stake.38 The generalized emancipation of European Jewry and the fact that emancipation was 
seen as indicative of modernity resulted in Spain’s portrayal as backwards and traditional.  
Spanish nationalization proceeded through an attempt to reincorporate Jews into their 
history and to use them as cultural emissaries. Part of Spain’s process of nationalization and 
modernization was the revisiting of their past. During the twentieth century Spain’s conception 
of modernity became contingent upon the extension of rights of citizenship to those who they 
previously expelled in order to be held in high regard among members of “advanced,” 
“progressive” European nations. Thus, in 1924 Spain attempted to reverse the Expulsion by 
granting citizenship to its Sephardic Diasporic community by issuing the Primo de Rivera law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Radical revolutionary politics benefitted French Jews greatly and as the French Revolution of 1789 transitioned 
into Napoleon’s Empire, Napoleon’s ascendency to power resulted in the emancipation and granting of citizenship 
of many of Europe’s Jews (not in Spain, however). Ibid., 244.  
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Chapter 2: “Like a Light Through Glass” 
 
Spanish Relations with Sephardim in the Twentieth Century  
The Primo de Rivera Law is just one example of Spain trying to reverse the Expulsion 
and present itself in a positive and enlightened light to the rest of Western Europe. Clearly, the 
theme of expulsion and national myth associated with the reconquest of Spain carried forward 
into modern day. During this time, it began to be considered a harmful mistake, which resulted in 
the decline of Spain’s Golden Age. The idea that the Expulsion of the Jews in 1492 represented a 
historical blunder was first articulated and then popularized following the disastrous year of 
1898, when Spain lost the final remnants of its historical empire:  Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the 
Philippines.39 The state’s post-imperial identity crisis and economic recession forced Spaniards 
to look towards the past and reevaluate their previous actions.  Looking for answers, some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The Spanish–American War was a conflict in 1898 between Spain and the United States that was caused by 
American intervention in the ongoing Cuban War of Independence. American attacks on Spain's Pacific possessions 
then caused the Philippine–American War. The end result was the 1898 Treaty of Paris, which favored the United 
States; it allowed temporary American control of Cuba and gave the United States colonial authority over Puerto 
Rico, Guam and the Philippine islands, all of which were previously controlled by Spain. The defeat and collapse of 
the Spanish Empire was a blow to Spanish national pride, and led to a philosophical and artistic reevaluation of 
Spanish society known as the Generation of '98.  See Isabelle Rohr, The Spanish Right and the Jews, 1898-1945: 
anti-Semitism and Opportunism (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2007), 10. 
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critical Spaniards became convinced that the Expulsion of the Jews in 1492 had resulted in a 
series of crises for Spain. 
Scholar Eduardo Martín de Pozuelo described this “bad conscience,” saying “in Spain 
there didn’t exist this angry hatred of the Jew; on the contrary, probably the bad conscience 
generated in the Spanish subconscious for the Expulsion of the Sephardim in 1492 inspired 
philo-semitic legal norms” in the early twentieth century.40 Thus, part of the Franco regime’s 
mentality towards the Jews was influenced by the idea of the Expulsion and compensating for 
this historical blunder.  
The strong waves of anti-Semitism that hit Central and Eastern Europe in the twentieth 
century actually paralleled an opposite era within Spain:  a campaign of philo-sephardism or 
“love of Sephardic Jews.”  This term, which differs from philo-semitism or “love of Jews” 
generally speaking, is not necessarily synonymous with positive relations.  A state can have 
periods of relatively smooth relations with Jews and still be anti-Semitic.  In this case, Spain 
entered into a period of appreciation for the cultural ties Sephardic Jews shared with Spaniards at 
large.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 “En España no existía este rabioso odio a lo judío; al contrario, probamente la mala conciencia generada en el 
subconsciente español por la expulsión de los sefarditas en 1492 inspiró normas legales pro semitas” (pg. 20). 
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Several events triggered a renewed interest in the Sephardim or this campaign of philo-
Sephardism. For instance, in 1920 the Casa de Sephardim41 was founded in Madrid by Angel 
Pulido.42 Pulido was particularly impressed by Sephardic Jews and started a positive campaign 
lauding their cultural and economic benefits. He specifically highlighted their potential to help 
Spanish business interests in the parts of the Mediterranean.43 In this respect, the Sephardim were 
elevated to the highest position amongst all other Jews, “a true aristocracy among Jews” due to 
the “supremacy” of Spanish culture and a belief that the Sephardim would help save Spain from 
economic ruin slowly took hold.44 While this image of the Spanish Jew was clearly a major 
improvement from the notion of “enemy” of the Expulsion era, it is important to note that the 
philo-sephardic trend did not free the Jews from anti-Semitic stereotypes but “actually usually 
amplified them” as well as emphasized the idea of Sephardic racial purity.45 Clearly, then, Spain 
held many contradictory notions about Jews and still maintained many classical anti-Semitic 
stereotypes, as well as some “semi-racial” conceptions of Jews. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 “House of the Sephardim” 
42 Pulido was a prominent doctor and politician in Spain.  He encountered Sephardic Jews on a trip to Danube in 
1903 and was extremely impressed by this Spanish community. As a result of this trip, he started a cultural and 
economic campaign in favor of the Sephardim: Bernd Rother Franco y el Holocausto (Madrid, Spain: Marcial Pons 
Historia, 2005), 34.  
43 Rother, Franco y el Holocausto, 37.   
44 Rother, Franco y el Holocausto, 41 and Rohr, The Spanish Right and the Jews, 27.  
45 Rother, Ibid.  
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Despite these contradictory notions, Spain’s trend towards philo-sephardism is clearly 
mirrored in its legislation. On December 1, 1869, General Francisco Serrano officially revoked 
the 15th century Edict of Expulsion based on newly espoused revolutionary principles.46 This 
action took place a year after the Glorious Revolution in Spain (1868), in which Queen Isabella 
II was removed from the throne. This revocation of the Edict of Expulsion naturally held a strong 
ideological significance but far more important was the Primo de Rivera law of December 20, 
1924, a royal decree which granted full citizenship to “individuals of Spanish origin who had 
enjoyed the protection of Spain’s diplomatic agents as if they were Spanish citizens and were 
under the false impression that they already were Spanish citizens.”47 This law expanded Spain’s 
influence on the Sephardic Jews by granting Spanish citizenship and protection to them.   
Spain’s granting of citizenship to the Sephardim was effectively the opposite direction 
from that most other European nations were taking at the time. The motives of this action were 
two-fold. The first was to obtain redemption for the Expulsion amongst both the Jews and the 
rest of the “civilized” world.  Spain could be considered “modern” only by participating in post-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The revolution was committed to basic human rights, such as the commitment to religious freedom. In 1869, the 
article of the new declaration regarding freedom of religion was adopted by majority vote. Specifically, article 21 
maintained the importance of Catholicism within Spain but also assured freedom of worship for foreigners and 
Spaniards alike. The passage of this law revealed the liberal trend that was politically accepted in nineteenth century 
Spain: Avni, Spain, The Jews, and Franco, 11.  
47 Rohr, The Spanish Right and the Jews, 27.   
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Enlightenment Jewish emancipation or the extension of civil rights throughout Western Europe.  
Second, this action was a means through which Spain could spread its influence, creating 
something akin to imperialism of a trans-national Jewish diaspora that could claim Spanish 
citizenship. Similar to the way Italy had illusions of imperial grandeur, Spain too hoped to gain 
glory by recognizing the Sephardim as Spanish and compete in the European imperial 
framework.  
Despite this “enlightened” action, the reactionary trends in Spain became more salient 
with the advent of Franco’s Second Republic following the Spanish Civil War. Francisco Franco, 
the Spanish general, dictator and leader of the Nationalist military rebellion during the Spanish 
Civil War later became the authoritarian head of Spain from 1936 until he died in 1975. Franco’s 
authoritarian regime was premised on a new nationalistic and traditional Spain, a Spain 
associated with the anti-Semitism of past times. The Franco regime’s stress on nationalism and 
tradition evoked the anti-Semitism of the past. Additionally, the importance Franco placed on 
Spain’s roots in Catholicism, a church steeped in anti-Semitic tradition, also promised a 
resurgence of anti-Semitism.  Yet, racial anti-Semitism did not take hold in Spain in the 
twentieth century the way it did in the rest of Europe. The Germans were quick to take note of 
this; according to German ambassador in Madrid Eberhard von Stohrer “the Spaniards do not 
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understand the concept of race the way national-socialism defines it.”48 While anti-Semitism 
absolutely existed within Spain and while certain elements of racialism existed in their elevation 
of Sephardic Jews over Ashkenazi Jews, Spaniards never expressed the same hatred of Jews as 
much of the rest of Europe did. 
As a result, most of the western progressive intelligentsia considered Spain to be an 
outcast as a fascist country.  Spain’s fascist regime, along with Italy’s, were social pariahs to the 
western world fighting for “freedom” and “democracy,” but ironically the safest locations for the 
Jews in all of Europe were actually within these very countries. In Spain “there were no gas 
chambers or persecution and killings imbued with sadism for the type of anti-Semitism installed 
in the regime was, more or less, no more than returning some refugees that had crossed their 
border clandestinely.”49 In Spain, a country that appeared to have so little promise based on a 
long and traumatic history, the Jews of 1940s Europe found an unexpected haven.  This analytic 
framework presents the problem of officials from fascist countries acting in philo-semitic ways: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 “Los españoles no comprenden el concept de raza que define el nacionalsocialismo”: Eduardo Martín de Pozuelo, 
El Franquismo, cómplice del Holocausto y otros episodios desconocidos de la dictadura (Barcelona, Spain: Libros 
de Vanguardia, 2012), 46.  
49 “En España no había cámaras de gas ni persecución asesina de semejante sadismo; el antisemitismo mas o menos 
instalado en el régimen no fue mucho mas allá de devolver a algunos evadidos que habían cruzado la frontera 
clandestinamente”: Diego Carcedo, Entre bestias y héroes: Los Españoles que plantaron cara al Holocausto 
(Espasa: Barcelona, España, 201), 18.  
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these were the “bad” countries from most historiographic viewpoints of World War Two—yet 
the diplomats from these countries acted in exemplary ways. 
 
Spain at the Beginning of World War Two and the Significance of Spanish Nationality 
The importance of the 1924 Primo de Rivera in the context of World War Two is crucial 
to underscore. This law served as the conceptual underpinning for the diplomatic aid and the 
granting of visas provided to the Sephardim overseas during World War Two when these 
diplomats eventually used this law differently than was originally intended.50 Spanish diplomats 
used vague language such as “individuals of Spanish origin” rather than a direct reference to 
“Jews” or “Sephardim” to reinterpret this law and use it in a way that best suited their political 
and legal agenda:  saving the Jews.  
Many prominent figures of Spain’s Second Republic51 supported Jewish interests and 
these sympathies were illustrated with agreements signed by Spain, Egypt, and Greece in which 
Jewish families were protected by Spain.52 Between this positive treatment and the steady growth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Lipschitz, Franco, Spain, the Jews, and the Holocaust, 10. 
51 Spain’s Second Republic was the government of Spain from 14, 1931 until General Francisco Franco staged a 
military rebellion. It was formed when King Alfonso XIII left the country after Republican candidates won a 
majority in municipal elections.  The government of the Second Republic was exiled on April 1, 1939, when the 
loyalist Republican forces surrendered at the end of the Spanish Civil War to rebel forces (nacionales) led by 
Franco.  
52 Avni, Spain, The Jews, and Franco, 38.  
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in the Jewish population of Spain until 1936, Spanish-Jewish relations remained on very good 
terms. In fact, Francisco Franco’s  press officer made a statement explicitly denying an anti-
Semitic basis to the Spanish nationalist movement saying, “an anti-Jewish policy in Spain 
presumes the existence of a Jewish problem, which does not exist in this country.”53 This 
statement was released, however, only after the Western press expressed concern over anti-
Semitic tirades by General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, a notorious anti-Semite and important 
member of the rebel leadership54 Despite Franco’s anti-Semitic murmurings at times, his regime 
never instituted any specific anti-Semitic or racially conceived policies and many facets of his 
regime, such as Spanish diplomats, showed great benevolence to the Sephardim.  
 
The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the Guernica 
The Spanish Civil War set the stage for the Sephardim to receive diplomatic aid during 
World War Two. The Spanish Civil War, which took place from 1936-1939, began when a group 
of generals under Jose Sanjuruj55 declared themselves in opposition to the elected government of 
the Second Spanish Republic. The rebel coup was only partially successful, and Spain was left 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Avni, Spain, The Jews, and Franco, 49-50. 
54 Ibid., 49. 
55 General in the Spanish army who was an important conspirator in the military uprising the resulted in the Spanish 
Civil War.  
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both politically and military divided. Franco himself became important when he began a war of 
attrition against the established government in an effort to gain control of Spain. During the Civil 
War, Hitler came to Franco and the Nationalists’ aid, seeing a potential ally in a regime an 
ideologically fascist stance similar to Germany’s.56 This aid came in the form of military 
assistance, creating strong bonds between Spain and members of the Axis powers. The Germans 
later used this assistance as ammunition behind their request for Spanish support during World 
War Two.  
Certain aspects of the Spanish Civil War were tinged with anti-Semitism.  Franco 
expressed confusing and inconsistent sentiments about the Jews throughout the course of his 
regime. During the Civil War, numerous right-wing groups spread Judeo-Masonic Bolshevik 
conspiracy theories57 to foster the unification of various groups against a common enemy – the 
Jews.58 Franco himself made several anti-Semitic slurs prior to the Spanish Civil War, and his 
propaganda frequently attacked the Jews, linking them with Masonry and communism. In fact, in 
a 1939 Christmas message Franco noted,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Stanely G. Payne, The Spanish Civil War (Cambridge, GB: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 136.  
57 The name given to the claim that Jews have been the driving force behind Communist movements, or sometimes 
more specifically Soviet Bolshevism. Judeo-Bolshevism is a catchword for the idea that Communism is a Jewish 
conspiracy, and it has often coincided with nationalistic tendencies in the 20th century and 21st century. Especially 
in Fascist nations who demonize Communism, this was a particularly dangerous mentality and way to create a 
scapegoat.  
58 Rohr, The Spanish Right and the Jews, 138.   
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[N]ow that you all comprehend the motives of distinct nations for fighting and 
staying away from the activities of that race [the Jews] in which greediness is a 
stigma that characterizes them, their dominance in society causes an annoyance 
and danger. We, by the grace of God and the clear vision of the Catholic Kings, 
have had centuries free of this heavy burden, and we cannot remain indifferent 
before the new formation of the greedy and egotistical spirit.59  
It is important to note that this speech was given a few months following the outbreak of World 
War Two and the Germans were likely putting intense pressure on Franco to support the Axis 
Powers. Additionally, this quote may very well be the source of the exceptionalizing of 
Sephardic Jews:  the notion that Jews in general may be bad, but a small minority is sometimes 
helpful. This is especially the case if this minority comprises Jews of Spanish heritage. Sephardic 
Jews are better than Ashkenazi Jews because at least they are Spanish–so went the reasoning. 
This idea does not correlate to not being anti-Semitic, but rather to complex, multi-tiered notions 
of ethnicity that can be used opportunistically when convenient.  
The inhumane actions of Franco’s Nationalist forces against Republicans and their 
sympathizers in the Civil War were symbolized for the rest of Europe, and later the world, in 
Picasso’s painting Guernica, commissioned by the Spanish Republican government in 1937 (see 
figure 4). The bombing of a Basque village by German and Italian warplanes, carried out at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 “Ahora comprenderéis los motivos de las distintas naciones para combatir y alejar de sus actividades aquella razas 
en las que la codicia es el estigma que las caracteriza, pues su predominio en la sociedad es causea de perturbación y 
peligros. Nosotros, que por la gracia de dios y la clara visión de los reyes católicos, hace siglos que nos libramos de 
esta pesada carga, no podemos permanecer indiferentes ante la nueva formación de espíritus codicias y egoístas”: 
Carcedo, Entre bestias y héroes, 26.  
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behest of Franco’s nationalist forces, is memorialized in this haunting image:  beyond the 
specific subject matter, the Guernica came to represent the tragedy of war:  its destruction, its 
senseless killings of the innocent.  Furthermore, this image, which circulated in Western Europe 
and the United States through copies and photographs, was joined by other media descriptions of 
the brutality of Franco’s forces.  After a bloody three years, the Civil War ended in 1939 with a 
loss of the Republicans to Franco’s Nationalists. The end of the Civil War resulted in a long-term 
Fascist dictatorship headed by Franco, now known internationally for ruthlessness. 
     
    Figure 4: Guernica (1937). Source: www.pablopicasso.org  
The Spanish Civil War thus presented the next perfect opportunity for Spain to use the 
Sephardim for its own self-fashioning purposes. Franco’s government, in a sort of public 
relations campaign, later claimed an “enlightened” and liberal treatment of the Sephardim during 
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World War Two, painting Franco to the rest of Western Europe as a savior of the Jews.  Most 
likely, Franco authorized this representation to help downplay the atrocities of his regime and to 
contrast his own brutal fascist reign to Hitler’s.  
Yet in reality, Jewish communities within the Spanish republic actually did welcome 
Spain’s new Nationalist-headed regime due to its philo-sephardic leaning.60 For instance, the 
new government made “several goodwill gestures” towards the Jews in its new constitution. 61   
This constitution granted Jews equal rights, declared that Spain had no official religion, and 
proclaimed freedom of worship, which are all hallmarks of modernity. Part of the reason for 
these gestures can be attributed to the fact that during the Civil War, some wealthy Jews in the 
Spanish protectorate of Morocco62 contributed to the Nationalist cause and personally funded 
part of the war effort.63  These wartime contributions put these Jews in good standing with the 
new government once the Nationalists won the war.   
This new regime, which blamed the Jews for many abstract problems, ironically also 
created a center dedicated to the study of the culture and history of the Jews.64  In all these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Rohr, The Spanish Right and the Jews, 40. 
61 Ibid., 44. 
62 The Spanish protectorate over Morocco was established as part of Spain’s imperial project in 1912 under the Treat 
of Fez.  
63 Carcedo, Entre bestias y héroes, 26.   
64 Ibid., 28.  
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instances we see the ways in which Spain’s treatment of Sephardic Jews was construed as 
displaying, both to Spain and to other European states, Spain’s enlightenment and national 
culture in contrast to its reputation as a reactionary nation.  
 
World War Two, 1939-1945 
Spain’s relationship with Germany additionally influenced the Spanish regime’s attitude 
towards the Jews. As World War Two approached, Germany increasingly began to expect 
Spanish aid due to their support for Spanish National forces during the Spanish Civil War. 
However, the Civil War made Spain reluctant to take part in another war. With its economy 
already ravaged and the country in a state of disarray, Spain preferred to remain neutral, which 
greatly benefited the Sephardim.65 Eventually, Spain did in fact change its wartime status from 
that of neutral to non-belligerent on the side of the Axis powers and even deepened its 
involvement with Germany by sending its own “Blue Division” to the Russian front (see figure 
5).66 Part of the reason for this support was that for a short period of time Spain entertained the 
delusion that the Axis powers would help Spain in its quest to re-establish a Hispanic empire. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Avni, Spain, The Jews, and Franco, 56.  
66 David Wingate Pike, Franco and the Axis Stigma (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 100. 
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This “Gibraltar fixation” involved the idea that Spain would exercise authority once again over 
Gibraltar and regions of the French empire in northern and West Africa.67   
 
 
Figure 5: Hitler and Franco meet on the French side of the border on October 23, 1940.  
Source: www.guardian.co.uk    
 
Yet Spain’s position in the war constantly shifted to reflect an opportunistic attempt to 
gain support of the winning side. The extension of allied influence was strong and Franco began 
distancing himself from the Axis powers as early as October 1, 1942, when he explicitly defined 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Raanan Rein, In the Shadow of the Holocaust and the Inquisition: Israel’s Relations with  
Francoist Spain (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997), 23.  
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Spain’s position as neutral rather than nonbelligerent.68 In this light, many view Franco’s later 
benevolent gestures towards the Allies as an effort to join the winning side at the last minute and 
prevent any efforts to overthrow his authoritarian regime.69 Additionally, some view Spain’s 
positive treatment of the Jews as a concession made to the Allies to compensate for its previous 
collaboration with the Third Reich. Overall, Franco’s inconsistent and ambivalent actions have 
continued to perplex historians to this day, making his true motives impossible to discern.70  
By helping the Jews, Franco’s regime was able to gain some good publicity without 
actually having to do all that much or even allowing the Jews to stay. In this way, Franco could 
get good press and enrich Spain’s economy via Jews in transit without even allowing them to 
settle permanently in Spain. This arrangement resulted from a number of factors. For one, 
Spain’s location in Europe allowed it to play a crucial role in rescuing European Jews. For one, 
Spain shared a border with German occupied Europe. The Pyrenees separated “free” Spain from 
Vichy France, making the passage over this mountain range the virtual equivalent to the freedom 
passage through the Swiss Alps.71  
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70 Lipschitz, Franco, Spain, the Jews, and the Holocaust, 5.  
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Another important feature was Spain’s access to the sea through its ports and border with 
neutral Portugal, which provided means for refugees to flee the continent of Europe in search of 
a better life in the United States or South America.72 Additionally, Spain’s collaborative relations 
with Germany placed Spanish diplomats in the best position to help the Jews.  This collaboration 
allowed Spain to exercise its leverage to request concessions from Hitler. These close relations 
fostered circumstances in which “during the most critical stage of the Holocaust Spain’s capacity 
to rescue Jews was at its greatest.”73 Thus the “ideological and political proximity” of Spain to 
Germany placed the Spanish in an ideal position from which to help the Jews.74 The Jews who 
passed through Spain, both Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews, were issued visas requiring them to 
be “in transit,” meaning that Spain could not be their final destination. Repatriation itself was 
certainly a tenuous issue and according to Chaim Lipchitz, energetic consular protection was 
afforded “as long as Spain was not asked to repatriate her citizens.”75  
 Spanish officials allowed the Sephardim and “unpatriated citizens” to remain in Spain 
for only thirty days and then continue moving on to a different final destination, “going through 
the country like a light goes through glass, without a trace,” as foreign minister General Gomez 
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73 Avni, Spain, The Jews, and Franco, 67. 
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Jordana76 described it.77 This “light through glass” policy implied that the Spanish government 
did not want Jews to remain in or maybe even influence Spain, including the Sephardim. Despite 
these sentiments, Franco was quick to spin Spain’s’ role for the media and engaged in 
propagandistic efforts to exploit Spanish diplomatic aid as examples of his regime’s personal 
efforts to help the Jews for humanitarian purposes only.  
Indicative of this changed stance, diatribes against the Jews disappeared from Franco’s 
lexicon following 1943 with the turning tide of World War Two when Franco hoped to gain the 
support of the Allied powers.78 This is obviously an ironic projection of an ambivalent attitude 
towards the Jews, which clearly characterizes Franco himself, and how Jews were mere chess 
pieces to be used and manipulated in Franco’s larger game. Additionally, some Spaniards argue 
that information regarding the anti-Semitic persecution of Jews under the Franco regime was 
systematically destroyed and hidden towards the end of the war to sanitize Franco’s image to the 
western world.79  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Spanish foreign minister who allowed for increasingly good relations with Allies.  He replaced Serrano Sumner in 
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New evidence suggests that Franco actually compiled a list of Jews in Spain for the Nazis 
as requested by Heinrich Himmler.80  According to a 2010 El País newspaper article “General 
Franco gave list of Spanish Jews to the Nazis,” in 1941 Franco ordered his officials to make a list 
of 6,000 Jews living in Spain to be handed over to the Nazis as part of their Final Solution.81  
According to the article, provincial governors were warned to pay special attention to Sephardic 
Jews because “their Ladino language and Hispanic background helped them fit into Spanish 
society.”82 Additionally, the order, which was sent out in May of 1941, specified "their [the 
Sephardim] adaptation to our environment and their similar temperament allow them to hide 
their origins more easily” and therefore lent the Sephardim easier means of subverting Spanish 
society.83 This information was discovered in a secret Jewish archive, most of which was 
destroyed by the Spanish government following the defeat of the Nazis in 1945.84  
Furthermore, following World War Two Spain became a haven once again – this time to 
Nazi collaborators and criminals.85 After the war, the Franco regime was hospitable to a host of 
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81 The Final Solution was Nazi Germany's plan and execution of the systematic genocide of European Jews during 
World War II. The goal of this plan was to annihilate the Jewish people. Heinrich Himmler was the main architect of 
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infamous Nazis such as Louis Darquier de Pellepoix, Leon Degrelle, Reinhard Zpitzy and Hans 
Lazar.86 These individuals either chose to remain in Spain for some time or ironically used Spain 
as an escape route to Latin American countries (largely Argentina) just as many Jews had done 
during World War Two.87 
 
Spanish Bureaucratic Structure 
The formation and history of the Spanish diplomatic corps accounts for the aid provided 
to the Sephardim by some Spanish diplomats. According to scholar and Spanish diplomat (since 
1954) José Luis Ruiz Pérez, “Spanish history has moments in which diplomacy found itself 
facing a dilemma” where individuals forgot their loyalties to the Spanish state and Spanish 
diplomats worked against their own government.88 The Spanish diplomatic career was 
“configured as a special body of public function for the representation and international relations 
of the state.”89 The process of negotiation as well as the representative character of diplomatic 
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activity plays an important role in this career. The Congress of Vienna in 181590 established the 
fundamentals of diplomacy following the reorganization of Europe after the fall of the 
Napoleonic Empire.91 From this point until the First World War, diplomacy was considered an 
“art” or “science.”92 
 Specifically in Spain, the real decreto of 1844 organized the diplomatic career 
hierarchically into distinct categories so that the “diplomatic career would be comprised of 
extraordinary ambassadors.”93 The main goal of the decree was to create a system of gradual 
ascension in the hierarchical structure.94 However, the true start to the modern bureaucratic 
organization did not begin until much later. In 1883, as a consequence of a new state ministry 
under Marques de la Vega de Armijo, a less egalitarian system was put into place.95 As a result, 
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the great majority of members active in the Spanish diplomatic corps into World War Two 
remained members of the bourgeoisie and representatives of the aristocratic class.96 
   The Spanish diplomatic corps was again influenced by state affairs in 1936 with the 
advent of the Spanish Civil War.  The Spanish diplomatic corps was one of the bodies of the 
state administration that the Spanish Civil War most impacted by the drastic change in politics 
produced in Spain during this era.97 With the independence produced by the fall of the 
monarchy, the majority of Spanish diplomats actively continued serving the new regime. While 
many accepted the new republican government and saw its establishment as the road to a 
modernized Spain, others did not support Franco’s regime and the way in which it came to 
power.98 	  
The Spanish ranking system established its place in the new regime by the end of the 
Civil War. The diplomatic corps, however, did not achieve the full confidence of the new regime 
due to its characteristics and formation.99 Diaries from foreign minister General Gomez Jordana 
that were recently publish by his son contain phrases such as, “I took advantage of another 
occasion to demonstrate the small effect the diplomatic body has.”100 The first attempt at 	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100“aprovechó una vez mas la ocasión para demostrar su poco afecto al cuerpo diplomático”: Ibid.,171.  
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restructuring the ranking of diplomats occurred on July 18, 1936 when Franco came to power.101 
It was not until November 7, 1942 however, that Franco’s government established an official 
diplomatic school.102 
 Until 1942, the diplomatic institution did not appear to have an exclusive mission or 
specific professional socialization of the new members to the career.103 According to scholar José 
Luis Ruiz Pérez, the majority of members in the Spanish diplomatic corps in 1936 were 
conservative but not necessarily opposed to the republican regime.104 With the creation of the 
diplomatic school, there was a qualitative jump in the role of the state and its responsibility in the 
process of selection and personal formation of the diplomatic corps.105 Additionally, the 
diplomatic school introduced a change in the system of selection of new diplomats; this selection 
was aimed at developing conditions to unify the diplomatic corps before their entrance into the 
Spanish rank.106 Through a process of purification and reform, the Spanish government hoped to 
unite the motivations of the political character of the diplomatic corps.107 To do this, the process 
sought to eliminate those aspiring diplomats who despite demonstrating sufficient technical 	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knowledge did not possess other important qualities, such as loyalty. Those interested in 
becoming a diplomat had to demonstrate “good conduct and impeccable moral and social 
records” with a focus on ideological and political ideology.108 The purpose of a bureaucracy, 
according to the Spanish diplomatic core, was to act as an extension of the state administration. 
As a consequence, the personal politics by individual bureaucrats should match the central 
government’s politics, because the individual politics of a diplomat impact their actions in their 
post.109 It was preferred that diplomats subvert their personal politics to state concerns and 
positions. Despite these efforts of consolidation, some Spanish diplomats who remained in exile 
for a prolonged period of time developed an active opposition to the new regime, assuming 
functions representative of the republican government in exile, especially in the years following 
the end of the Second World War.110 The fact is Franco inherited diplomatic corps never formed 
in fascist ideology or schooled by the new regime and it appears he only began moving to change 
it about 1942. 
 The actions taken by Spanish diplomats abroad during World War Two are directly 
connected to the history of the Spanish diplomatic corps. For one, it is clear that the majority of 
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diplomats came from the higher echelons of society; these class, cultural, and educational 
connections were shared by the Sephardim and may have added an element of empathy, which 
may account for the life-saving actions.  Additionally, it is clear that Franco did not establish a 
clear agenda for his diplomats or an institutionalized training system prior to 1942.111 This 
institutionalization suggests that Franco knew that his diplomats were acting however they saw 
fit, and he did not feel confident in their choices.  The 1942 institutionalization of the diplomatic 
corps was Franco’s attempt to correct this problem and to create a cohort of diplomats that was 
an extension of his regime with the same ideological leanings. 
Finally, it is reasonable to surmise that the Spanish Civil War had a profound impact on 
the Spanish diplomatic corps.  Archival documents and secondary sources suggest in various 
ways that these diplomats were nationalists, believing strongly that they were Spanish, not part 
of a larger fascist fabric that Germany was molding in Europe.  This Spanish form of fascism 
wielded its own power and had its own ideologies independent of German National Socialism.  
In this context, the Sephardim, recently offered citizenship, become symbols of Spanish national 
pride: where the other states in Europe were ignoring the threats to Jews from Nazi Germany, 
diplomats could fashion Spain as an enlightened exception, consistent with Franco’s ideology 
surrounding the self-fashioning of his own unique and exceptional regime.  	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While some of these diplomats may have actively chosen to work in opposition to the 
Franco regime out of political difference, others may have worked against their government 
purely because they were doing what they thought was morally right.  Additionally, in the anti-
Jewish climate of Nazi-occupied Europe, perhaps some Spanish diplomats, in their role as 
representatives of their country abroad, felt a personal sense of shame regarding their country’s 
charged history related to the Jews.  Due their country’s past, maybe they hoped to do their part 
to avoid another, modern wrongdoing to these Spaniards (and Jews).   
 
Discussion of Spanish Diplomats  
While the motives behind Franco’s actions were opportunistic, this does not undermine 
the humanitarian work that Spanish diplomats did on behalf of the Sephardim in a separate vein 
from the Franco regime.  Their actions can be explained by a variety of factors – the lack of 
institutionalization of the Spanish diplomatic corps following the Civil War, the upper-class 
status of these diplomats who shared class connections with the Sephardim, and their distance 
from the regime. The farther these diplomats were located from Spain, the further they were able 
to push the bounds of the bureaucratic power and the more subversive actions they could get 
away with. Despite these diplomats’ brave actions, Spain’s relations with Germany during World 
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War Two and its subsequent diplomatic problems with Israel sadly prevented them from being 
fully recognized for their role in saving Jewish lives during World War Two.112  
As discussed previously, Ashkenazi Jews, such as Mireille, were able to escape to 
freedom by crossing Spain’s border. Yet the majority of Jews saved by Spain’s efforts were the 
Sephardim who lived in a diaspora far outside of Spain’s borders. Often times, Spanish 
diplomats invoked the Primo de Rivera decree of December 20, 1924 to receive Spain’s 
protection. And while Franco in particular sent ambivalent messages, many of Spain’s Jews 
enjoyed energetic and strong consular protection by a number of Spanish diplomats. These 
Spanish bureaucrats expressed a personal stake in the wellbeing of the Sephardim in a major 
contrast from Franco and his motives. This network of consuls and diplomats treated and 
considered these Spanish Jews as Spaniards and deserving of Spain’s aid. On Spain’s border, 
diplomats in France were able to save many Sephardim by disregarding Spain’s orders without 
serious consequence. At a distance from Spain, diplomats in Greece and Bulgaria were able to 
push their insubordination to its limits. Ultimately, both Franco’s own ambiguous polices in 
conjunction with a long, bloody, and ironic Jewish past creates a compelling framework for 
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understanding the consular aid granted by many Spanish diplomats throughout Europe as a case 
of its own.   
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Chapter 3: Diplomacy at the Border:  Bernardo Rolland of France113 
 
 
 
                          Figure 6: Distance from Spain to France, 625.5 miles.   
Source: googlemaps.com. 
 
 
 
Background  
In France, Spanish diplomats were notorious for aiding the Sephardim. In contrast to the 
far distances from Spain to Greece, France was much closer to home, located on Spain’s border 
(see figure 6).  Geography created a common boundary, across which refugees fled.  This 
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geography is what put the Spanish diplomats in Spain in such an important position. This 
common boundary also allowed Spain to wield greater control over its diplomats and their 
subversive actions. Geography afforded diplomats greater discretion as their network with Spain 
became more distant. This geography combined with the fact that that Spain had begun to claim 
Sephardim as citizens in the late nineteenth century understanding worked in conjunction with 
each other and resulted in Spain’s diplomats saving many Jews from France. Despite the Spanish 
regime’s efforts, Spanish diplomats, particularly Bernardo Rolland, Consul General of Paris, 
were still able to use various means of deception, rule bending, and exceptions to help save 
Spanish Jews.  
First, border control and Spanish-French and Spanish-German relations regarding 
refugees crossing the border will be discussed to put diplomatic aid into context. Then, the heroic 
work of Spanish Consul General of Paris, Bernardo Rolland, will be discussed to provide an 
example of Spanish-diplomatic efforts on behalf of the Sephardim as a close proximity to Spain. 
The combination of beneficial neglect on behalf of Franco and the willingness of Spanish 
diplomats to help created the ideal situation for the rescue of Sephardim. Specifically, Spanish 
diplomats helped the Sephardim in two key ways:  they issued transit visas and protected their 
property as an extension of Spanish property.  The bureaucratic system helps to explain the 
discrepancies between Spain’s instructions and diplomatic actions. 
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Sephardic Refugees from France  
Spanish diplomats helped the large number of Jewish refugees114 who crossed the Spanish-
French border after the German occupation of France (see figure 8). During World War Two, 
France and its allies were defeated in the Battle of France and signed an armistice with Germany 
on June 22, 1940. The terms set forth by this armistice designated the north and west region of 
France as a zone to be occupied by the German army. France, headed by Philippe Petain,115 was 
subordinated to the Germans. The rest of the country remained a “free zone.”    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 I use refugee here to describe individuals fleeing their country of origin to escape Nazi domination.  
115Vichy France, the regime following the Third Republic, is a common term to describe the government of France 
that collaborated with the Axis powers from July 1940 to August 1944, during the Second World War.  
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                  Figure 8: Map of Pyrenees Mountains on the border of Spain and France.  
                   Source:	  www.worldatlas.com.  
 
 The arrival of the Germans resulted in a massive surge of refugees trying to cross the 
Pyrenees into unoccupied Spain. These refugees were largely Jews from France and other locales 
in Europe; they were joined in flight by Spaniards and other Europeans (Jews and non-Jews) 
who did not want to be subjected to German control. Most of the refugees entered Spain from 
Vichy France (see figure 9). Therefore, the geographical location of Spain placed it in a strategic 
and historically significant location.   
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             Figure 9: Map showing borders of Vichy and Occupied France.  
Source: www.oocities.org.   
 
Sephardim as well as Jews from Germany and elsewhere in Europe began passing 
through Spain as early as 1939, the majority with proper documentation and the majority of them 
were not returned to the Nazis.116 However, as the war progressed and as the Germans made their 
way through Europe, the number of Jews without documentation rose exponentially. The 
statistics speak for themselves. Haim Avni concludes that 23,000 Jews of various countries 
crossed the Pyrenees between 1939 and 1944 whereas Bernd Rother poses an even higher 
number, 20,000 to 35,000.117 There is absolutely no denying that many Jews, both Sephardic and 	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Ashkenazi, found the path to freedom by crossing the Spanish border. Flight into Spain was 
certainly not always without issue: though many Sephardim passed into Spain unchallenged, 
between 1942 and 1944, 10,000 to 12,000 Jews were arrested at the border and some were sent 
to Miranda de Ebro, the Spanish concentration camp.118 Even when issues arose and regardless 
of an “arrest” at the hands of the Spanish was nowhere near equivalent to being sent to the death 
camps of Eastern Europe.119 It is also noteworthy to realize that Jews and all other prisoners 
received the same treatment in Miranda de Ebro120 and suffered no form of religious persecution 
(see figure 10).121  
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119 Ibid.,137.  
120 Miranda de Ebro was established first as a concentration camp for foreign prisoners during the Spanish Civil War 
and later was the location where refugees without representative diplomats were placed during the Second World 
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population saturation, but the lives of those interned were never at stake.  In the words of French Jew Henri 
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Figure 10: Miranda de Ebro Concentration Camp in Spain.  Source: jaff40s.blogspot.com. 
 
At the same time, some scholars argue that many prisoners were, in fact, returned to the 
French police, which was under the control of the Gestapo. Accordingly, the Germany embassy 
in Madrid, which exercised a great deal of influence on internal and external politics, took a 
particular interest in the movement of Jews across the Spanish border and went to great lengths 
to stop this movement.122 From 1942 and onward, the Gestapo installed itself in various cities 
such as Marseille and Perpignan in Vichy France with the very objective of supervising border 
control.123   
 The naming of Francisco Gómez Jordana as Spain’s minister of foreign affairs in 1942 in 
place of Rámon Serrano Suñer124 was a key factor in the treatment of refugees.125 While Serrano 
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123 Ibid., 40. 
124 Ramón Serrano was a Spanish politician during the first stages of General Francisco Franco's dictatorship and 
was the Interior and Foreign Affairs Minister until 1942.  He was particularly known for his pro-Third Reich stance 
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Suñer was a Nazi sympathizer, Gomez Jordana had closer ties with the allies and was more 
willing to help Jewish refugees. The German embassy in Spain chose to acknowledge the mass 
arrival of refugees in Spain and the various networks of protection available to them, and was 
quick to denounce the Spanish government.126 Throughout September 1940, Spain opened and 
closed its border multiple times and on March 25, 1943, Spain caved again to German pressure 
and closed the border and reinforce its border control.  During this time, thousands of Jewish 
families in France moved between the Spanish and Portuguese consuls in an effort to find any 
means of gaining entrance to the sanctified Iberian Peninsula.127   
An informant from the Spanish consul in Hendaye best described the situation of these 
refugees: “these people in a large part Jews of distinct nationalities, dominated by true panic, 
want to enter Spain at any cost.…”128 It is important to realize the severity of the conditions of 
this journey; crossing the Pyrenees was a dangerous endeavor in which refugees faced freezing 
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Russian front.  
125 Calvet, Las Montañas de la libertad, 108. 
126 Ibid., 111. 
127 Ibid., 23.  
128 Estas personas, en su mayor parte judíos de distintas nacionalidades, dominadas por verdadero pánico, querían 
entrar en España a toda costa: Carcedo, Entre bestias y héroes, 42.  
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temperatures, starvation, treacherous terrain, and perhaps worst of all, the wrath of the 
Gestapo.129 In crossing the Pyrenees, survival was largely a matter of chance.  
 
Border Control 
A letter from Perpignan written on November 27, 1942 sheds light on the nature of 
border closure for it places the onus of the closure of the border on the French authorities. This 
letter, from an unnamed Spanish consulate member, is addressed to Spain and expresses the great 
impact that this closure had on the consulate due to its “geographic” position.  It is possible that 
the author of this note intended to remain anonymous, thus helping to protect diplomats from 
punishment at the hands of the Spanish government. Ultimately, the letter discusses the 
difficulties that this border closure has placed on both individuals with Spanish passports and 
Spanish families detained at the border. The consulate member ultimately begs Spain to “reopen 
the frontier or obtain special treatment” from the Vichy authorities.130  
This document demonstrated the difference in policy advocated by the Spanish 
bureaucrats (albeit unnamed) and the Spanish government at large. Franco’s regime supported 
the closure of the border because it served as a means of curtailing Nazi complaints and proving 
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130 Letter: November 27, 1942: Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival Research.   
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themselves as “trustworthy” allies despite their otherwise lack of involvement in the war. Yet 
this policy was strongly opposed by the Spanish consulates across France. Not only was it 
difficult to refuse desperate petitioners, but the policy added an extra element of responsibility to 
consular work. This was because these officials had to manage the affairs of those turned away 
from the border with visas, those detained, etc. While Jews are not explicitly mentioned in this 
document, it can be assumed that many of those holding Spanish visas were of Jewish ethnicity. 
It appears that these bureaucrats in question felt that regular Spanish citizens and Jewish-Spanish 
citizens were not irreconcilable categories.   
On December 10, 1942,131 the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arguably because of 
the complaints elicited by Spanish consuls in France, wrote a letter to the French embassy. This 
letter discusses the difficulties faced by consuls, particularly those in the south of France along 
the Spanish border. The letter admits that consular officials are unable to resolve the problems of 
refugees trapped at the border without the help of French authorities and describes the current 
situation as a “vicious cycle with grave consequences for many people.”132 As a result of this 
opinion, the letter informs the French authorities that the Ministry would “greatly appreciate” the 
French embassy granting Spain special treatment “with the urgency that the case requires” to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Described as a “nota verbal” in archival documents, I am not exactly sure what a verbal note is. I am guessing 
that it was a note dictated by a bureaucrat and recorded/sent to another embassy. 
132 Verbal Note: December 10, 1942, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival Research. 
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deal with those detained at the border.133  Ultimately, while the closure of the border between 
France and Spain is controversial and speaks to Spain’s alignment with Germany and occupied 
France, these documents indicate that Spain’s loyalties down the diplomatic line were not so 
clear-cut.  Even while initially agreeing to close the border the Spanish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs continued to petition France to reopen the border. As the war progressed, it is clear that 
the Spanish regime opportunistically agreed to keep the border open to ingratiate themselves 
with the allies who were winning the war. 
Even more surprising than such Spanish appeals to reopen the border, numerous as they 
were, is the conciliatory way in which Germany responded. The German embassy’s response to 
the Minister of Foreign Affair’s December 10, 1942 verbal note reveals that the Germans issued 
a new decree referring to the “passage on the frontier through France and Switzerland.” This 
decree allowed for people “who have obtained permission” in the form of a Spanish visas to 
continue in transit while they kept the frontier closed for those without proper documentation. 
Officially, this was a policy that Spain endorsed as well (even though some Spanish diplomats 
conveniently overlooked those cases without proper visas). For their part, the French Embassy 
expressed a similar sentiment to the Germans in their Verbal Note to Spain, saying that Vichy 
authorities will directly intervene to “greet Spanish subjects that have justified reasons” to leave 	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France. Of course, the evident accord on these matters can be seen as superficial: the 
terminology of “justified reasons” clearly leaves a great deal of leeway for interpretation. 
 Despite the overriding closure of the border as ordered by Spain, many Spanish diplomats 
were eager to find loopholes in this policy and personally appealed to local authorities. A 
message written by an anonymous consul member of Perpignan, the very location where 
Mireille’s own family crossed the border, noted the arrival of an expedition of Sephardim 
heading to Spain that arrived at the closed border without authorization of the Germany 
authorities of Vichy France in order to pass through Port-Bou. This consul member describes the 
vigorous formalities considered sufficient to gain the permission of the German authorities of 
Perpignan and the difficulty of the situation overall. As a result, the Spanish embassy was “trying 
to obtain authorization from Vichy so that they [the Sephardim] can cross the border” which 
clearly reveals the work of some diplomats on behalf of the Spanish Jews. Due to this work as 
well as subsequent pressure from the allies, the Spanish government eventually reopened its 
border.134  
Overall, Allied pressure played a major role in influencing Spanish policy as explicitly 
stated by Prime Minister Churchill to a Spanish Ambassador in London: “if the Spanish 
government went the length of preventing these unfortunate people seeking safety from the 	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horror of Nazi domination, and if they went further and committed the offense of actually 
handing them back to the German authorities, that would be the destruction of good relations.”135 
Spain was left in a difficult position: trying to ingratiate both the Germans, with whom they 
wanted to appear as an equal partner and the Allies, whose success became more and more 
apparent as the war progressed.  
Many individuals cite the closing of the Spanish border as an example of German-
Spanish cooperation during the war. However, discerning the true sentiments of any of the war 
parties is a difficult task. The behavior of the French authorities was “unpredictable” and “did 
not respond to unified criteria.”136 The same goes for Spain. A sense of improvisation and 
inventiveness, which corresponded with the development of the war, characterized the politics of 
Franco’s regime.137 For instance, Franco initially complied very much with the Nazi regime.  But 
later on, as the tide of the war changed, this complicity began to deteriorate.138 As early as 
August 1942, the U.S. Embassy in Madrid obtained a guarantee from the Spanish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs that no illegal refugees, namely Jews, would be returned to their country against 
their will.139  	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Additionally, in the spring of 1943 Jews began inundating Spain due to Spain’s new 
favoritism towards the Allies.140  By 1944, the Spanish government worked to ease the 
conditions for the repatriation of Jews to the United States and Latin America, including those 
Jews without clear-cut ties to Spain.141 Once in Spain, vast networks of international aid 
organizations, such as JOINT, the Red Cross, and the Jewish Distribution Committee (JDC)142 
were available to help these Jewish refugees.143 
 
Spanish Diplomats in France 
 Spanish diplomats in France were notorious for failing to follow Spain’s orders in many 
of the several consulates that operated in France under the supervision of the ambassador in 
Vichy, José Félix Lequerica.  In many cases, although they cloaked their language in complex, 
vague, and bureaucratic language, Spanish diplomats in France acknowledged the special 
protection rights of the Sephardim as well as Spain’s job to protect them. For instance, secretary 
of the Spanish bureau of commerce in France, Jose de Olozaga, took it upon himself to 
encourage the heads of the foreign ministry to support the rights of “Spanish nationals,” or in 
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other words, the Sephardim.144 The mission of this initiative was to “base contacts with French 
authorities on the French-Spanish agreement of January 7, 1862 regarding the rights and mutual 
protection of interests of citizens [French and Spanish] of both countries.”145 Olozaga achieved 
his goal of protecting citizen rights when on March 7, 1942 when the Spanish foreign ministry 
wrote to Ambassador Lequerica: “Upon instructions from the foreign ministry…you are 
requested to defend the interests of Jewish nationals of Spanish origin by demanding the French 
authorities to comply with the 1862 agreement.”146  
Similarly, the Spanish consul in Marseille ignored Madrid’s orders and on February 1, 
1943 required the ignominious label juif147 be removed from both ration cards and personal 
documents for Spanish Jews.148 The consul’s superiors in Madrid later undid this action. Such a 
contradiction in the actions of a working diplomat and his distant superior reveals the attitudes of 
many Spanish diplomats located in France, among them Bernardo Rolland, the consul general of 
Spain in Paris. Rolland is constantly named as a crucial figure in the repatriation of Jews, both 
Sephardic and Ashkenazi (see figure 11).149 	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             Figure 11: Bernardo Rolland de Miota: Consul General of Spain in Paris.  
Source: www.raoulwallenberg.net. 
 
Rolland distinguished himself from other diplomats in a variety of ways, most notably for his 
work as a “civil servant of prestige and as a person with profound humanitarian sentiments that 
undoubtedly suggested he would be able to do what he could to help in the difficult situation he 
found himself in.”150 For one, he occasionally stood up to his ambassador, Jose Félix Lequerica 
and urged him to contradict France’s pro-Nazi government when it came to matters regarding 
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Jews.151 Such disagreements made for a tense relationship between the two men. Moreover, in 
moments when the embassy seemed far away from Vichy and the Spanish consul in Paris, 
Rolland openly disregarded instructions that he considered “unjust and which went against his 
conscience.”152 Rolland relied on Spain’s decree of 1924, which considered the Sephardim as 
Spaniards and did not view the “Jew” and the Spaniard” as incompatible categories. As a result, 
Rolland used this decree on numerous occasions as legal grounds for his actions. This mentality 
deeply irked the Germans stationed in Vichy France due to the important role played by Vichy as 
a transit zone from France to Spain for many refugees. This is evidenced by German 
Ambassador Otto Abetz’s complaints in a letter sent to his ministry:  
[I]t is confirmed that the Spaniards have a great interest in protecting the Jews of 
Spanish nationality from the application of the German decrees against the 
Jews…these men [the Spanish diplomats] don’t understand the explanation that 
all the Jews, without exception, are obligated to be inscribed in the registry and 
that exceptions are inadmissible. They don’t see any difference between the 
concept of Jews and Spaniard. The Jews of Spanish nationality they consider 
Spaniards, not Jews.153 
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Abetz was not the only one to make such a report. The German embassy was full of 
complaints regarding Spanish consulates that showed special zeal in the defense of the 
Sephardim and their interests.154 In this case, it seems that a sense of selectivity existed in which 
diplomats often chose not to understand the difference between Jew and Spaniard.  
Consistent with his protection of Sephardim as Spaniards, Rolland fought the Statues des 
Juifs, adopted in Vichy France in 1940-41 (see figure 12). This set of laws discriminated in 
various ways against French Jews in an effort to differentiate them from the rest of the French 
populace. Rolland’s efforts succeeded in 1942 when it became impossible for Vichy authorities 
to confiscate the Sephardim’s property. In doing so, Rolland helped to assert Spain’s dominance 
in the region. By claiming the Sephardim, Spain claimed the Spanish presence and dominance 
over their assets by extension. This can be viewed through the lens of an imperialist framework; 
the Spanish could spread its control and power through a trans-national Jewish diaspora that 
could claim Spanish citizenship. By reclaiming the property of the Sephardim, Spanish diplomats 
were effectively “reclaiming” the Sephardim as Spanish citizens.  
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                Figure 12: Jewish Statutes passed in France. Source: jssnews.com.  
Additionally, Rolland contacted German authorities in Paris in a risky initiative to 
repatriate 2,000 Spanish nationals to the Spanish-controlled zone of Morocco. Franco’s regime 
ultimately rejected this endeavor.155 He also appealed to the Spanish embassy in Berlin in August 
of 1941 and actively intervened in favor of Spanish nationals to remove them from the Drancy156 
internment camp.157 Without consulting those who would surely not authorize such efforts, 
Rolland took persistent and determined action, risking his personal welfare as well as status.158   
  While Bernardo Rolland is the best-known diplomat for his work in freeing Sephardim 
interned at Drancy, other consuls, such as the one in Marseille, also contributed to this activity. 	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In a letter dated January 14, 1944, the consul in Marseille discussed the situation of the Sephardi 
D. Semaya de Mayo Misrachi who was detained in Drancy. In this letter, the consul members 
demand that Mr. Mayo “ought to be considered as Spaniards, and protected as such” and insisted 
on the “immediate liberation of the detained.”159 Another letter, dated February 19, 1943 written 
in Paris by Ambassador Lequerica himself also touches on this matter. According to Lequerica, 
“the consul in Marseille has informed me that nine Sephardim of Spanish nationality have been 
detained in Drancy (see figure 13). Immediately I demanded that they be freed.”160 This equality 
of Spanish Jews to Catholic Spaniards in the eyes of Spanish diplomats in France is discernible 
in these documents.   
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Figure 13: Location of Drancy, a German internment camp, in France.  Source: www.ushmm.org. 
 
Even for French Jews, Rolland and other Spanish diplomats offered similar services of 
aid. For instance, in September of 1943, despite Germany’s pressures, Spain evacuated French 
citizens (some of who were Jews) from the coast of Cadiz, Algeciras and Malaga.161 Even 
though Rolland finished his term as Consul General in Paris in mid-1943, it is clear that his 
efforts to help the Jews of France influenced the decision to make these evacuations happen.162 
Overall, it is clear that Rolland was subversive within the bounds of the power given to him and 
used the bureaucratic structure to work in his favor.  
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Despite efforts by both Rolland and other Spanish diplomats in France, at certain point 
during the war Jordana (the Spanish foreign minister) unequivocally forbade the increase in the 
number of Jews coming to Spain. Yet even with Madrid’s inhibitive orders, Spanish 
representatives in Paris refused to stop defending the property of Spanish Jews.163 This 
insubordination became such a problem in fact that on October 8, 1940, Madrid issued a decree 
which prevented Spanish consuls from granting transit visas without first sending all requests by 
telegraph to Spain.164 In this way, the Spanish regime highlighted the great contradiction that 
existed in the way in which the Spanish diplomat corps and Franco’s central administration were 
handling the same issue.165 This issue speaks to the very nature of bureaucracy and the difficulty 
in squaring the actions of the central Spanish government with those of its diplomats.166   
 In the issuing of visas, Spanish diplomats were able to push the bounds of the 
bureaucratic system and ignore explicit instructions from Franco’s regime. Lequerica wrote in a 
letter written on April 3, 1943, “[I]nstructions have been transmitted to our consuls 
recommending that they take the maximum scruple in their execution. I’ve also asked for 
information about the Sephardim’s petitions for entrance in Spain that have already been 
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repatriated…and that the rest remain waiting until the consuls send me their information and we 
study it precisely.”  Less than three weeks later, Lequerica writes from Paris again, addressing 
the insubordination of consuls in adhering to this request. He writes, “Spanish consuls, 
particularly those in Marseille, have allowed numerous instances of Sephardim, none of who 
have the proper documentation necessary as indicated by Spain in the previous telegram, to 
enter.” While specific names of diplomats accused of these actions are not given, these 
documents speak to the pervasive “problem” of permissiveness towards Sephardim entering 
Spain. This is also important because these consuls were in Vichy, a location through which 
many refugees escaped, while the ambassador was in Paris.      
 In addition to diplomatic aid, countless Spanish civilians living close to the border 
offered a welcoming hand to these refugees. As described by North American journalist Tad 
Schulz: 
Close to 25 years ago, I had my first sight of Madrid. I was 14 and my mom and I 
had fled France as the Nazi troops advanced. We had crossed the French-Spanish 
border in the Pyrenees and took a bus that brought us over the mountains to the 
town of Lerida. There we spent the night in the house of a beautiful young woman 
who always wore black. Her husband had been killed in the civil war which had 
ended a year previously, but I never found out on what side he fought. Even 
though we didn’t know a word of Spanish, the widower and her family showed us 
compassion and kindness with gestures and smiles. They offered us abundant 
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food despite the fact that this was a country suffering from war.”167  
At the same time, however, not all of the help Jews received upon crossing the border was 
motivated by humanitarian sentiments. Many Spanish guides familiar with the mountainous 
terrain, for instance, served as passeurs, who for financial gain, guided refugees across the 
border.168      
Beyond these solitary Spanish individuals, extensive networks of aid existed throughout 
France dedicated to helping Spanish diplomats aid refugees in their escape to Spain. One 
notorious network was the Pat O’Leary network which helped both evading servicemen169 and 
Jewish refugees alike escape from the north of France to Marseille and across the Pyrenees 
mountains.170 Nationalists and anarchists aided this network, most of who were Spanish exiles 
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willing to risk their lives in the face of the Gestapo and French soldiers.171 The center of the Pat 
O’Leary operations was Hotel Paris in Toulouse, where groups gathered together and embarked 
on their perilous mission at dawn.172 The proximity to the escape routes through Spain from a 
strategic viewpoint made this route one of the most successful throughout the war. In fact, 
famous journalist Varian Fry173 spearheaded the existence of this escape route during World War 
Two.174 Ultimately, this network owed much of its success to the fact that it maintained 
particularly good contact with Spanish diplomats throughout the process of housing and guiding 
those who passed secretly across the Spanish-French border.175 This secret underground network 
highlights the commitment and risk-taking that went on which was well outside the normal 
bounds of diplomatic work.          
 At the end of the day, the majority of Jewish refugees who managed to cross the border, 
both legally and illegally, were ultimately not turned in to the Germans.176 Diplomats, Spanish 
citizens, and extensive aid networks worked in conjunction to help save these Jews. Despite the 
fact that the Franco regime “oscillated almost schizophrenically” the actual Spanish consuls in 	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France remained committed to their country’s citizens.177  
Theories of Bureaucracy Applied on the Border      
 Clearly then, individuals in the different levels of the Spanish state apparatus held 
differing positions on the proper course of action to take with respect to a very important topic– 
the Sephardim. Current historiography treats Spanish diplomats as a separate entity from the 
Spanish government yet fails to delve into the question of why Spanish diplomats locations 
worked to save the Jews. What factors influenced these diplomats and made them so open to 
disregarding their government’s instructions?  Did some have Jewish relatives, roots, or even 
Jewish blood? Were they secretly opposed to the Franco regime?  Or was there something in 
their training that influenced their mentality towards the Jews? This was likely a concept of the 
Spanish nation-state that included Sephardim—as it had developed in the late 19th- and early 20th 
-- centuries.  That sense of Spanish nationhood overrode the political exigencies of the Franco 
regime. Franco’s policy shifted according to his evaluation of who was likely to come out on top 
in World War Two. Unfortunately, part of the reason the historiography in this facet of Spanish 
history is lacking is that information regarding these questions is hard to come by.  
 Based on the words and works of other diplomats describing their experiences abroad, 
one feasible hypothesis explaining the paradigm of Spanish diplomatic action abroad during 	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World War Two is the personal ties they felt to the Sephardim due to the latter group’s historical 
and cultural relationship with Spain. The case of Bernardo Rolland is unique due to the close 
proximity France had to Spain. This proximity to Spain limited is actions and subjected him to 
tighter control by the Franco regime than Radigales in Greece and Palencia in Bulgaria.  
Additionally, the shared border between Vichy and Spain, with a tiny part of the border between 
occupied France and Spain helped many refugees escape. With this in mind, it is interesting to 
see where the bounds of power stopped as well as the different forms of power violations: 
speech, personal involvement, and family adoption.          
 
Conclusion           
 In light of the discussed diplomatic theories, it is clear that despite the fact that Spain 
operated as a “bureaucracy” and employed “bureaucrats” internationally to exercise Spain’s 
authority, its diplomats to save as many Jews as it did abroad. At the same time, Spain certainty 
did not realize its full potential in the number of Jews it theoretically could have saved. If the 
Spanish government had been entirely on board with the wishes of its Spanish diplomats, many 
more Jews could have been saved. Thus, while the disorganization of the Spanish bureaucracy 
was useful to the Spanish diplomats it also hindered a full-scale refugee relief effort. Especially 
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when compared to the “powerful and effective mechanization of the German bureaucracy which 
didn’t delay,”178 the Spanish bureaucracy in actuality was somewhat incompetent, slow to act, 
and confusing in its instructions. This speaks to the inherent confusion and unclear agenda of the 
Franco regime with respect to the Sephardim and serves to highlight further the humanitarian 
efforts of the Spanish diplomats as a separate entity from the Franco administration as well as to 
explain why these diplomats were able to act in the way that they did.    
 The two following chapters deal with the humanitarian efforts of Sebastián Romero de 
Radigales in Greece and Julio Palencia in Bulgaria. These diplomats had a greater degree of 
freedom than Bernardo Rolland by virtue of the fact that they were located a greater distance 
from Spain. The importance of the shared Franco-Spanish border in making the situation 
particularly acute for Rolland is also important to recognize. He lack of this border farther from 
Spain allowed Spanish diplomats in locations such as Greece and Bulgaria to push the limits of 
bureaucracy and use the bureaucratic structure to their advantage to help save as many Spanish 
Jews as possible. The reasons for why these diplomats acted the way they did still remains 
enigmatic but possible explanations are given to explain this conundrum.  
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Chapter 4: Diplomacy at a Distance: Sebastián Romero de Radigales of Greece179 
 
 
 
Bureaucracy Operation 
 
 Both Sebastián Romero de Radigales in Greece and Julio Palencia in Bulgaria were 
Spanish diplomats that operated at a considerable distance from the Franco regime. Because of 
this, they exercised greater autonomy than Spanish diplomats stationed in France. The distance 
of both Greece and Bulgaria from Spain only exacerbated the difficulty of communication at this 
time. This distance made these diplomats’ protection of Sephardim easier to accomplish. The 
importance of communication technology in diplomacy, especially when diplomats operate from 
a distance, has always played an important role in diplomatic instruction.   
 During World War Two, poor communication technology was compounded with the fact 
that Franco’s government did not give clear instructions regarding the Sephardim. This lack of 
communication left Spanish diplomats in a position where they had to make their own decisions, 
in some cases using this power to help the Jews.  At other times, lack of information hindered 
Spanish diplomats’ efforts help without the backing of their larger government. This freedom 
resulted in many cases where diplomats either improvised without instructions or acted in direct 
opposition to instructions received in the hope that the lag time in diplomatic communication 	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would mean that higher figures would overlook their infractions. Exploring the nature of the 
broader functioning of bureaucracy provides insight into how power functioned in a very diffuse 
way in the far reaches of the Franco regime. Both Franco and his diplomats often had different 
and competing agendas, and parties seem to have manipulated their knowledge of the system to 
their advantage. Because of this, it is important to view Spain not as a monolith but rather as 
made up of numerous branches operating on many different levels. 
 
Greece, Pre- and Post-World War Two 
 
                                  
                          Figure 14: Distance from Spain to Greece, 1,917 miles.  
Source: googlemaps.com. 
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 Spain’s relationship with the Sephardim of Greece is well known (see figure 14). The 
Sephardic community of Salonika, which is basically nonexistent today, was one of the largest in 
the world prior to World War Two.180 Spain’s connection with the Jewish community in Greece, 
specifically that of Salonika, goes back to 1912 when the Greeks conquered the city and openly 
targeted the Jews.181 This event provided Spain with its first chance to extend protection to the 
Spanish Jews who exhibited considerable Spanish influence in the region.182 In this case, the two 
countries reached an agreement in April 1915, but overall Spain was fairly reserved in providing 
aid to these Sephardim.183 So historically, at least, the Sephardim have sometimes been tied to 
Spain’s national and political interests. 
Later on, Spain revealed its “selective” pro-Jewish sympathies when it signed agreements 
with Egypt in 1935 and Greece in 1936, which explicitly protected Sephardic families residing in 
these areas.184 These treaties placed these Sephardim under Spanish consular protection and in 
December of 1948, Franco published a decree giving them the status of “Spanish citizens 
abroad.”185 Although these measures were beneficial to the Sephardim, we must take them with a 
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grain of salt. The timing of these measures was certainty calculated: Israel had received 
international recognition from many members of the international community during this period 
and Franco used these treaties as a means to gain Jewish support within Israel which will be 
elaborated on in the conclusion.186 Additionally, the Spanish were anxious about the Arab world 
and were interested in “world Jewish” support.  In 1946 Franco had sought admission to the U.N. 
and Israel played a crucial role in its veto abilities to deny Spain admission from this institution 
and subsequently from receiving aid from the Marshall plan. Thus, Spain’s relationship with 
Greece was one based largely on the motive of national interest, which sometimes worked in the 
Spanish Jews’ favor. Franco’s pervasive concern with maintaining a positive global reputation 
similarly influenced Spain’s actions in Greece during World War Two with regard to the 
Sephardim.187  
 
World War Two 
The case of Greece during World Word Two is particularly interesting because both the 
Germans and the Italians occupied it. Before 1941, there were approximately 60,000 Sephardic 
Jews living in Greece, but the Nazis murdered 90% of the Sephardim during the war.188 In fact, 	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following World War Two, a mere 1,200 Spanish Jews remained in Greece, most of who 
eventually immigrated to Palestine.189 These statistics speak to the complete devastation the 
Nazis caused Greece’s Jewish population, despite the efforts of Spanish diplomats. The German 
occupation also brought about terrible hardships for the Greek civilian population at large, not 
just the Jews. Over 300,000 civilians died in Athens from starvation, and many thousands died as 
a result of reprisals by Nazis and their collaborators.  
In 1941, the Nazis officially invaded Greece, which greatly affected the fate of the Sephardim 
residing there. The situation of the Jews remained normal until July of 1942 when the Germans 
implemented anti-Semitic policies in the zones of Greece where they exercised control.190 In 
Italian controlled Athens, life remained normal for the Jews. In Salonika, however, the Nazi 
authorities instituted measures against the Jews such as the requirement to wear the Star of David 
on their clothing and the limits on their movement throughout the city. 
The situation of these Spanish Jews grew more dire as German plans to evacuate and 
intern these Jews became apparent, and the Spanish government’s need to take action and defend 
its compatriots’ interests became obvious.191  
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German Policy in Greece 
The Nazis issued an ultimatum on April 29, 1943 to embassies in Rome, Ankara, Madrid, 
Budapest, Bucharest, and Lisbon. In the ultimatum, which marked their official policy on the 
Sephardim, Berlin communicated to local governments that there would be an “increase in the 
general actions against the Jews in the zone of Salonika and suggested the repatriation of citizen 
Jews before the 15th of June this year.”192 Thus, the Germans would permit the remaining 
Spanish Jews in their territory of occupied Greece to leave, granted that they be removed from 
the country by Spain before the 15th of June.193 This would be done, according to the Germans, 
through a mass transport of Jews desiring repatriation, an action – and expense – that Franco was 
not willing to undertake. In this way, German policy toward the Sephardim in Greece and 
Bulgaria, differed from Nazi policy in northern and—especially—Eastern Europe. 
Meanwhile, the Italians controlled the zone of Athens, which greatly influenced Spanish 
diplomatic activity in the region. Spanish diplomats were able to bypass German demands made 
in Salonika by conspiring with the Italians. This made it easier for the two Catholic fascist 
regimes to reinforce each other’s policies toward Jews. 
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Franco’s Vacillation 
A wide gap existed between German demands and Franco’s authorization of action, 
which enabled Radigales’ efforts.194 Even with pressure from its own diplomats, and numerous 
appeals by Spanish nationals, Franco’s regime remained very reluctant to facilitate the 
repatriation of the Sephardim.195 While Franco’s regime did not explicitly say no to allowing the 
Jews to repatriate, it would not facilitate this action either. This was probably due to the high cost 
of transporting and repatriating the Spanish Jews, as well as Franco’s desire to remain non-
committal to any particular policy that could be seen as either pro or anti-Nazi. It is definitely 
possible that Franco intentionally delayed responding with the knowledge that some diplomats 
were sympathetic to the Jews and would protect them. In this way, he could allow these 
diplomats to help without deeply angering the Germans because he could argue that he did not 
authorize this action. These bureaucratic checks and balances were apolitical. They could work 
both ways and could be exploited to anyone’s advantage if they knew how to work the system.  
In March 1943, the Germans began deporting Jews in Greece but made an exception for foreign 
nationals, such as Spanish Jews holding a valid Spanish passport.196 As Germany began to 
narrow in on all Jews in Greece without exception, Spain initially agreed to repatriate all Jewish 	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nationals and “demanded they be treated as Spaniards in every respect.”197 However, despite this 
promising declaration, Franco entirely changed his position in an abrupt and unanticipated 
fashion. Although no one knows the exact reason for this about-face, it is most likely attributable 
to the larger-than-expected number of Spanish Jews requesting repatriation.198 Additionally, 
although the Germans agreed to the repatriation of the Spanish Jews, they demanded that Spain 
both organize and finance the entire process.199 Franco, with Spain’s economy in shambles as a 
result of the Civil War, most likely did not want to commit the necessary sum to finance this 
endeavor. Thus, only one day after Germany accepted Spain’s terms, Spain reneged on its 
agreement to accept its Spanish Jews.200 This one-day time frame indicates that this default may 
have been a power play – trying to appear as a strong state by pushing an agenda but secretly 
hoping it would be denied. International diplomacy is full of smoke and mirrors and it is difficult 
to ascertain the true motives in these tenuous situations. 
There are also examples of Franco’s regime intentionally dragging its heels in the hopes 
of avoiding dealing with the issue and committing actual resources.  In October of 1943, 155 
Spanish Jews in Athens were arrested and deported to concentration camps, despite Radigales’ 
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protests.201 Later on, on December 22nd after much procrastination, Spanish officials contacted 
the foreign ministry in Berlin to reveal that they were finally ready to repatriate the Spanish 
Jews; this gesture, however, came far too late.202  By the time an agreement was finally made 
between Berlin and Madrid, many of the Sephardim were on the verge of death.203 It was not 
until February of 1944 when 367 Spanish-Jewish refugees from Salonika finally arrived in Spain 
that they were greeted in a “friendly and impressive” manner. But this reception hardly 
compensated for Spain’s ambivalent treatment of the Jews prior to this repatriation.204 As scholar 
Eduardo Martín de Pozuelo put it, “the Sephardim arrived in Barcelona, ignorant of the 
background of their journey and believing that Franco had saved them.”205 Thus, it appears that 
the Spanish government wanted to capitalize on its display of generosity as part of a show for the 
Allied powers.206  
Bernd Rother best sums up the irony underlying Spain’s position: “[T]he fundamental 
contradiction was that on the one hand Spain did not want to tolerate the persecution of its Jews 
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203 Carcedo, Entre bestias y héroes, 158. 
204 Lipschitz, Franco, Spain, the Jews, and the Holocaust, 98. 
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salvado: Martín de Pozuelo, El Franquismo, 110.  
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but on the other hand it was not ready to allow their immigration.”207  Franco’s government was 
absolutely aware of the consequences awaiting Spanish Jews who it did not repatriate.  
Telegrams from numerous diplomats urgently warned of imminent danger to these Spanish 
citizens. Ultimately, even Spanish diplomats like Radigales were quick to point out that Spain’s 
behavior created a negative image of Spain in the international community, noting “all other 
governments had repatriated their Jews in Greece, even the Italian fascists.”208 So, while foreign 
affairs considerations held important clout in Spain’s consideration of its Jews, economic 
motives proved paramount in shaping Spain’s final decisions. 
 
Spanish Consul in Greece 
         The Spanish consul in Greece played a vital role in communicating the situation of the 
Spanish Jews in Greece to Madrid and in advocating for Spain’s assistance despite the Spanish 
regime’s vacillating behavior. The Spanish consulate in Salonika was initially headed by 
Salomon Ezraty,209 himself a Jew, whereas the Spanish consul in Athens was headed by Eduardo 
Gasset.210 In mid-April 1943 the new Consul General Sebastián Romero de Radigales took over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Stanely G. Payne, Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II, 222-223. 
208 Ibid., 226.  
209 Head of the Spanish consulate in Salonika until the middle of April 1943 when Sebastián de Romero Radigales 
arrived to Athens as the new Consul General of Spain.  
210 Ibid., 82. 
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in Athens.211 While there is no conclusive evidence whether Ezraty and Radigales met, it is 
likely that the two diplomats knew each other and or had met. It is furthermore possible that 
Ezraty imposed a sense of moral obligation on Radigales and made him feel responsible for the 
Sephardim in Greece as he took over his post.  An archival document written by Radigales 
indicates this: he claimed he “devoted his best efforts to protecting rights and welfare of Jewish 
protégés” from the moment he arrived in Greece or perhaps from the moment he met Ezraty.212  
The sense of empathy Radigales felt for the Sephardim is obvious in a letter dated May of 
1943 in which he describes the situation of the Sephardim of Spanish nationality residing in 
Greece as “extremely tragic.” In addition, in the same letter Radigales reveals that he personally 
“begged [that] the Jews […] to be exempt from the restrictions placed upon them from the 
Greeks.”213 He offered comfort and support the anguished Spanish Jewish community in Greece, 
reassuring them that “because their people and interests are safe, and that nothing can occur 
while there has been no agreement made about them between our government and the Third 
Reich.”214   Despite these diplomatic efforts and Radigales’ empathy, most Jews were left to the 
Germans.    
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 A mere two weeks after Radigales arrived in Greece, Adolf Eichmann215 arrived from 
Germany to create a special plan involving the transport of Greek Jews to the extermination 
camps in the East.216 The Spanish consul responded rapidly to his arrival and communicated 
exactly what was occurring in Madrid, as well as the German plan to deport the Jews of Greece 
in phases. Without waiting for instructions, Radigales interviewed the German ambassador, 
Gunther Altenburg,217 to obtain as much information regarding the deportation plans as possible 
and then urgently informed the Spanish government of what he learned.218  
Radigales proposed numerous and innovative repatriation plans to Madrid, which 
demonstrated his personal efforts to save the Sephardim. One such plan included providing entry 
visas for Spanish Jews to either Spain or the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco.219  He was also an 
emphatic supporter of repatriating Jews in groups or via group visas to allow the escape of as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 A German Nazi SS lieutenant colonel and one of the major organizers of the Holocaust. Because of his 
organizational talents and ideological reliability, Eichmann was given the job of facilitating and managing the 
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216 Carcedo, Entre bestias y héroes, 150. 
217Altenburg was a career diplomat whose first assignments took him to postings at Rome, Vienna and Bucharest.  
He remained involved with southeastern Europe throughout his career. 
218 Ibid.  
219 The Spanish protectorate of Morocco was the area of Morocco under colonial rule by the Spanish empire. This 
protectorate was established by the Treaty of Fez in 1912 and ended in 1956, when both France and Spain 
recognized Moroccan independence. During WW2, many Spanish bureaucrats suggested sending Sephardim to this 
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many Jews as possible as quickly as possible.220 He suggested on May 6, 1943 “if the Sephardim 
returning to Spain is not convenient, they can be distributed in populations of the zone of our 
[Moroccan] protectorate, in which there already exist many thousands of Hebrews that are of our 
nationality.” In this case, Radigales is referring to the Spanish protectorate of Morocco.  
Radigales’ also demonstrated his inclination towards group passports a letter written in 
July of 1943 in which he told representatives in Madrid, “it is advisable, in the interest of saving 
time and work, that the expedition of the necessary passports, safe-conduct/pass are made in the 
form of a collective passport that require only one visa.”221  
It is also apparent from this document that Radigales took advantage of the lack of 
definitive instructions and used this to his benefit.  He said, “as this representation has not 
received any order to refrain from intervening in the favor of them, my predecessor continued to 
provide effective support and I, from the first moment, have done as much as possible to protect 
them.”222   
When Radigales still failed to get Franco to take action, he decided to act of his own 
accord.223 The fact that the Italians administered Athens held special significance for Radigales 
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because he could negotiate face-to-face with the Italians to transport Sephardim from Athens. 
For instance, he went so far as conspiring with Italian authorities, without consulting the 
Germans, to transport the Sephardim from Salonika in the German zone to Italian-occupied 
Athens.224 Radigales’ deception deeply angered Ambassador Altenberg who had specifically 
requested that Radigales delay his talks with the Italian government until an agreement between 
Spain and Germany had been reached.225 In another desperate gesture, Radigales personally went 
to a train station where Jews were boarding an Italian train bound for the death camp Auschwitz-
Birkenau.226 While Radigales may not have known the full extent of the fate facing these 
individuals in the atmosphere of confusion and misinformation of the times, he did know that he 
would probably never see these Sephardim again. As a result, he obtained permission to remove 
the Sephardim from this train; he then placed them on a train headed to the zone under Italian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 The occupation of Greece by the Axis Powers began in April 1941 after the Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy 
invaded Greece, and lasted until Germany and her satellite Bulgaria withdrew from mainland Greece in October 
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control.227 These 150 Spanish nationals were protected once they were in the Italian zone, and 
they later found a means of escaping to Palestine.228 
               Radigales invoked moral pleas and imposed a sense of public and international shame 
on Spain to force the Spanish government into taking action. He was especially privy to Italy’s 
situation, another Fascist nation, and its efforts to help its own Jews. He wrote, “Italy effectively 
protects the Italian Jews residing in Greece and has the goal to send them to their country if they 
can’t avoid expulsion.” Radigales was clearly hinting to Madrid that they should take similar 
measures as the Italians.229 Thus, these fascist countries, similar in political ideology to the 
national socialism of Nazi Germany, acted on their own unique and nationalistic form of fascism. 
Radigales’ sense of urgency and desperation was apparent in his letters to Spain. 
Complaints about Madrid’s slow reaction time were rampant and expressed in a variety of ways:  
“I beg Spain to give me instructions as quickly as possible”230  
“The complete lack of instructions…I have not been answered which puts me in a 
difficult situation”231  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Carcedo, Entre bestias y héroes, 152. 
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These repetitive statements give a sense of the frustration Radigales felt at the lack of support 
provided by the Spanish government. Spain’s inaction translated to Jews dying. At the same 
time, this communication gap allowed Radigales to use bureaucratic delays to his advantage. 
Remarkably, Radigales did not receive any clear instructions to stop him. This disconnect 
allowed Radigales’ efforts to go above and beyond the call of bureaucratic duty. He went so far 
as to “solicit the legations of the transit countries to ask their governments for authorizations to 
endorse the passports of those repatriated” with Spain contributing in a very limited manner to 
the process.232  
 What’s even more fascinating is the fact that the Germans were on board for this 
initiative and actually wanted the Sephardim out of Greece as quickly as possible. It is possible 
that the Germans simply wanted the Jews out, and if the Spanish or anybody else would take 
them, that would be okay.  Radigales’ efforts certainly paid off in this respect. However, it was 
Spain’s government, not Germany, which opposed the repatriation plan. A letter from Madrid 
dated July 13, 1943 in response to a letter written by Germans on July 8, 1943 states, “the 
Spanish government, after studying the case of the Sephardim of Salonika that desire to come to 
Spain, has understood no procedure of expediting a collective passport in your favor and have 
given instructions in this sense to your representatives in Greece.” In fact, Radigales described 	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the Germans as “gracious collaborators” in facilitating repatriation.233 In this case, Radigales’ 
language is important to consider.  
Although Radigales wrote this letter to Madrid, it is very possible that the Germans could 
have seen it and he was trying to flatter them by using this terminology. In true diplomatic form, 
individuals rarely say what they mean but rather say what will sound good or will work to their 
advantage in accomplishing a certain goal. Here, it seems that Radigales is attempting to 
ingratiate himself to the Germans so that they will heed his requests regarding the Spanish Jews.  
This is just one of many examples of Spanish diplomats using different tones in different letters 
to finesse their arguments to suit their particular needs. But the fact remains that it was Spain, not 
Germany that prevented the Sephardim in Greece from finding asylum. 
 
 
Sebastián Romero de Radigales’ Legacy 
Communications between Romero Radigales and the Spanish government offer a 
fascinating perspective on the job of “Spanish diplomat.” Radigales spoke directly with the 
Germans with a “seriousness that forced them to listen”234 according to a testimony by a 
Sephardic Jew. Radigales refused to take Germany’s opinion that Spain was disinterested as his 	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234 “Hablaba a los alemanes con durez y ellos tenía que escucharle,” Carcedo, Entre bestias y héroes, 159. 
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personal defining stance. Instead he chose to act on his own accord and greatly impacted the fate 
of many Sephardim. This disinterest appears to be an accurate description of the Spanish 
government’s stance. When Radigales noticed increasing German threats, he worked to aid the 
Jews even when officials in Spain had not given him orders to do so.235  
Even with Madrid’s ambiguous and non-committal behavior, Radigales was not 
disheartened and instead increased his efforts to help the Jews.236 He clearly favored a policy of 
repatriation and worked to convince Spain to act accordingly.237Without assistance from Spain, 
Radigales continued to help the Jews, intervening with the German ambassador to attempt the 
release of 350 Greek Jews in Bergen-Belsen on March 24, 1944 (see figure 15).238  
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            Figure 15: Bergen-Belsen Concentration Camp.239 Source:  www.ushmm.org  
The fact that this effort was unsuccessful does not diminish the credit it deserves.  
Radigales’ efforts were also crucial in communicating to the Spanish government the seriousness 
of the Jews’ situation. Only when the Spanish diplomats in both Berlin and Athens showed “the 
crude moral consequences through the detention of the Spanish Jews of Salonika and revealed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 This is particularly noteworthy because Bergen-Belsen was a work camp rather than a death camp. Due to the 
nature of the camp of this, this event can be seen as a moderate move on the part of the Germans; the Germans may 
have been testing the water with the Spanish. If the Franco regime protested the imprisonment of their Sephardim, 
they could easily be extradited from the work camp. But if sending the Sephardim to Bergen-Belsen elicited no 
reaction by the Spanish, Germany could then send the Sephardim somewhere more permanent – to the death camps 
in the East. It is also possible that the Germans had hoped that the Spanish would repatriate Sephardim, because 
German transportation and camps could not cope with an influx of Sephardim.  
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that the German government was serious about their ultimatum” did Spain authorize 
repatriation.240          
 Radigales’ genuine sympathy for the Jewish cause did not go unnoticed. In the words of a 
grateful Spanish Jew interviewed by scholar Federico Ysart: 
Mr. Romero has always been a father for us, a guide of safety, a prudent advisor, 
and when he has failed, a defender full of dignity and energy. With a bond never 
broken, he has received us at whatever hour of the day that we needed him and in 
those moments most critical for us, he has shown to all of us. The Sephardim of 
Greece will transmit to their descendants, this precious patrimony to narrate this 
tale of anguish, memory, and magnificent force realized by our ministry in 
Athens, Mr. Romero.241 
 A similar sentiment is echoed by Greek Sephardi Isaac Revah, recorded in Eduardo Martín de 
Pozuelo’s book:  
All of us, my parents, my sister and I were able to embark to Palestine which was 
under a British mandate. And in 1948, we immigrated to France and moved to 
Paris where I could study, receive my doctorate in physics, and find work. I had a 
lot of luck and never tire of repeating it I will never forget all that is thanks to 
Sebastian Romero Radigales.242  
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Radigales managed to save 500-600 Sephardim and these individuals remained extremely 
grateful.243 The Holocaust’s death toll, already staggering, would have been even greater without 
the courageous work and personal risk of Sebastian Romero de Radigales and other brave 
individuals like him. 
To this day, scholars continue to question why Spain’s Consul General acted in such a 
kind and humanitarian way towards the Jews. Some say that his wife was Jewish, others that he 
had Jewish relatives; however, these ideas represent mere hypotheses.244 No matter the reason, 
nearly all scholars agree that Radigales was a humanitarian who “actively took the side of his 
Jewish wards against the machinations of the Nazis.”245 For this reason, Radigales has received 
recognition by countries beyond Spain: he was, named an “individual meriting mention and 
praise”246 by Yad Vashem247 in Jerusalem.248Additionally, an Israeli postage company printed a 	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stamp honoring Radigales for his efforts during World War Two on behalf of the Sephardim (see 
figure 16).249 Ultimately, Radigales used his distance from Spain to his advantage in asserting his 
diplomatic powers to help the Sephardim with little resistance from Franco. By taking certain 
liberties, as well as improvising and coming up with innovative repatriation plans, Radigales 
certainly deserves the award he received by Yad Vashem if not a more serious award such as 
being inducted as a member of the Righteous Among the Nations.250  
 
Figure 16: Sebastián Romero de Radigales Honored on Israeli Postage Stamp.  
Source: www.raoulwallenberg.net. 	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Chapter 5: A Continuation, Diplomacy at a Distance: Julio Palencia of Bulgaria251 
 
 
          
          Figure 17: Distance from Spain to Bulgaria, 2033.7 miles.             
          Source: googlemaps.com. 
 
 Bulgaria During World War Two 
In a similar fashion to Radigales in Greece, Spanish diplomats in Bulgaria also used their 
distance from Spain to their advantage in saving Spanish Jews (see figure 17). Bulgaria was 
initially a neutral country during World War Two until March 1, 1941, when the country joined 
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the Axis Powers.252 Along with this alliance with Germany came new anti-Semitic legislative 
measures, which greatly impacted the Spanish-Jewish community residing there. Shortly 
following the institution of these laws, the Germans offered an ultimatum in July of 1942; Jews 
who did not exit the country by September 1st would be subjected to the same poor conditions as 
the Bulgarian Jews.253  
When Bulgaria annexed Macedonia on March 4, 1943, the Bulgarian government 
arrested all Jews in these districts and sent them to detention camps. The Bulgarians also turned 
over Jews in the occupied areas of Greece and Yugoslavia. From this point onward, anti-Jewish 
legislation increased in harshness. Interestingly, however, the Bulgarians did not end up shipping 
their own Jews away due to intervention by the King, Dimitar Peshev, as well as Bulgarian 
church officials and ordinary citizens.254 Peshev wrote, “I had the impression that the minister 
was confused and nervous, and although the full information in my possession contradicted his 
assertion that nothing new and unusual against the Jews was about to happen…For the moment 
that gave me satisfaction—after all the immediate goal of our initiative was to prevent these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 When the Second World War broke out, Bulgaria declared its neutrality. By 1941, however, Hitler needed 
Bulgaria to be compliant so that he could march his troops through Bulgaria en route to offensives against both 
Yugoslavia and Greece. Bulgaria agreed and subsequently gained some territorial gains in Yugoslavia and Greece 
by joining with Hitler. 
253 Ysart, España y los judíos, 121. 
254 Michael Bar-Zohar, Beyond Hitler's grasp: the heroic rescue of Bulgaria's Jews (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media, 
1998), 123. 
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people to be sent out of Bulgaria.”255 Parliament members insisted that the deportation of the 
Jews be cancelled immediately and would not leave Prime Minister Petur Gabrovski’s256 office 
until their demands were satisfied.257  The Nazis eventually backed down after witnessing this 
show of Bulgarian solidarity on behalf of the Jews. As a result, Bulgaria managed to save its 
entire Jewish population, numbering 48,000, during World War Two.258  
Despite this remarkable fact, Bulgaria still remained a country with strong anti-Jewish 
legislation, particularly in the beginning years of the war. During this time, the Spanish minister 
in Sofia, Julio Palencia, stepped in to the extreme benefit to the Sephardim. In response to 
Germany’s 1942 ultimatum, Palencia requested that the German legation grant transit visas for 
occupied countries to allow Spanish subjects to come to Spain.259 Palencia, who had established 
contact with the Sephardic community of Bulgaria prior to these measures, took the approach 
that “in Spain citizens of different categories classified for ethnic or religious reasons do not 
exist”260 and considered the Sephardim to have special ties to Spain.261 The Sephardic 	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256 A Bulgarian politician who briefly served as Prime Minister during the Second World War and began his 
political career as a Nazi, forming his own movement the Ratniks of the Advancement of the Bulgarian National 
Spirit. The group was strongly Anti-Semitic and was said to have links to Nazi Germany.   
257 Ibid. 
258  http://www1.yadvashem.org/yv/en/holocaust/about/09/balkans.asp. 
259  Ysart, España y los judíos, 121. 
260 La condición de raza o de religión de estas personas no cuenta en nuestra Legislación nacional.  
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community of Bulgaria was, in fact, one of the oldest and most prosperous in Europe; they had a 
beautiful temple in the middle of the city and maintained strong ties with their Spanish roots.262  
  
Spanish Consul in Bulgaria  
Julio Palencia dedicated his efforts to protecting this community. Initially, the 
collaborationist Bulgarian Prime Minister, Bogan Filov, believed Palencia to be Pro-Nazi 
because he was Franco’s representative.  He confided in Palencia secret German orders to begin 
the deportations of Bulgarian Jews, including the Sephardim.263 After this experience, Palencia 
made his pro-Sephardic attitude explicit, going so far as threatening the “precious collaboration” 
and “good relations” that existed between Germany and Spain if the Germans did not instruct the 
Bulgarians to treat the Sephardim properly (see figure 18).264  
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                      Figure 18: Spanish Diplomat Julio Palencia. Source: www.raoulwallenberg.net.  
 
Following the implementation of these laws, Palencia deeply desired to convey to Spain 
the full implications of the new anti-Semitic laws in Bulgaria. In June of 1942, he describes 
measures taken against the Jews, such as the fact that they were prohibited from saluting the 
Bulgarian flag and owning businesses. More importantly, he warns that not only will such 
campaigns continue, but also that new laws promulgated will be even more severe.265  
Into the month of July, he continued to update Madrid about the specific circumstances 
pertinent to the Sephardim and describes the sense of panic and nervousness within the Spanish 
colony. This clearly speaks to his sense of sympathy towards the Jewish community.266 He 
conveyed to Madrid that he didn’t have the “necessity of power in order to describe the panic 
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and nervousness and hysteria of the Israelite Spaniards” which he is certain Spain is already 
aware of due to the legation’s inundation “with demands for secondary help and protection, 
complaints, lamentations, and sobs.”267  
In 1943, Palencia increased his requests to the Spanish government to protect the 
Sephardim. While the Bulgarians ultimately spared their Jews from deportation, the looming fear 
of deportation was real and Palencia never felt safe or confident that his Sephardim would not be 
shipped off to the East.  A letter written to Madrid on March 17, 1943, Palencia discusses the 
anti-Semitic politics in Bulgaria and explains that the Bulgarians’ actions represent a 
“phenomenon” in which Bulgaria tried to compensate in its relations with Germany through its 
treatment of the Jews since Bulgaria did not wish to participate in the actual war.268  Palencia 
blames Bulgaria’s more extreme measures against the Jews as a Bulgarian fervor for Hitler’s 
“politics of destruction” and extermination of what the Fuhrer considers a “bad race” instead of 
fighting against the Soviet Union for Germany.269 These measures, according to Palencia, 
resulted in “intense panic” once more in the Spanish colony.270  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 Letter: May 27, 1943, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival Research. 
268 Letter: March, 17, 1943, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival Research. 
269 Ibid. 
270 Letter: March 25, 1943, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival Research. 
121	  
Besides this thoughtful interpretation of the events taking place in Bulgaria, Palencia 
describes how the Spanish consul protested the German actions taken against the Jews “without 
distinction of nationality.” This idea is particularly poignant because Palencia defended all Jews, 
not just the Sephardim. This defense is unique in that most Spanish diplomats who protected the 
Sephardim did so on the basis that Spanish Jews were superior to Ashkenazi Jews due to their 
Spanish roots.  It is equally likely that it was less that the Sephardim were superior so much as 
they had more jurisdiction over the treatment of Spanish nationals and could do more to help. It 
is particularly doubtful that those who risked their lives to help Jews cared about ethnic 
distinctions. Rather, this seems to be more of a rationalization and defense of Radigales’ actions 
to help him save more people. These Spanish diplomats used an argument that would appeal to 
fascist leanings and nationalist sensibilities while also protesting how the Germans treated Jews 
of Spanish nationality the same as Jews of other nationalities.   
Additionally, while other diplomats may not have truly believed in such racial 
hierarchies, they had jurisdiction over the Sephardic rather than Ashkenazim Jews and thus only 
had it in their power to help the Spanish Jews. Therefore, this distinction may have only been 
made to appease the Germans and relate to their racial discourses and may be a testament to the 
sad reality that there was nothing else these diplomats could do for Jews who were not 
Sephardic.   
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Besides this, Palencia also took direct action to help the Sephardim. For instance, he 
obtained immunity for 110 Spaniards protected by papers that “produced inevitable effects for 
those who bore the Spanish name, for without being Spanish, they would not be saved.”271  It 
appears that this idea represents more of a question of nationality than Sephardic “superiority.” 
Palencia also succeeded in obtaining cash for the Sephardim from their frozen deposits and his 
overall pro-Jewish stance earned him the nickname “the well-known friend of the Jews” in 
German correspondence.272  
In another heroic episode, instead of waiting for a response from Madrid, Palencia visited 
the most important Nazi representative in Bulgaria, Adolf Heinz Beckele, and announced that 
Spain was prepared to proceed with the repatriation of all Jews in Bulgaria.273 While this was not 
actually the case, the meeting resulted in a tense conversation. Later on, a German official 
described Palencia’s actions in Bulgaria via telegram, saying “he expressed disgust at the 
expulsion of the Jews of Sofia and has asked to intervene in favor of his friends, the Bulgarian 
Jews, which of course I have rejected.”274 Despite this sort of backlash, Palencia’s firmness did 
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achieve a certain level of success and successfully defended the interests of numerous Bulgarian 
Sephardic families.275  
 
Lack of Spanish Commitment 
It is apparent that as with the case of Greece, Franco’s regime failed to make its 
instructions either timely or explicit. Palencia emphasizes this by underlining the following 
sentence at the end of his letter on March of 1943: 
I would be very pleased with the V.E.276 if it could communicate with me by 
telegram how it decides to proceed, keep in mind that at the end of the next month 
of April start the deportations of Jewish residents in Bulgaria and if by this date 
Spain hasn’t decided anything in particular, I can’t do anything to help and protect 
our Spanish subjects.  
This sentiment is clearly emphasized in multiple letters.  By remaining non-committal, Franco 
allowed Jews to be saved by actions taken by his diplomats and yet if the Nazis became angered 
he could say that he never gave an order for these actions. In the same vein, he could take credit 
if the allies approved. Clearly then, a fine line existed in navigating the role of bureaucrat and the 
government at large. A bureaucrat could do a lot, but would not be taken seriously enough by the 
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276 I am not sure what V.E. stands for but it is obviously a form of a proper greeting for a diplomat to address the 
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German authorities to exercise complete enough authority to save the Jews.  Furthermore, it is 
important to remember that the Spanish government could revoke the power of these diplomats. 
Despite all of the difficulties Palencia encountered, he continued to put his best efforts 
forward and his actions went beyond the typical work of a diplomat. Palencia openly discussed 
with Madrid the “one ardent aspiration” of the Spanish Jews-to leave Bulgaria and find a more 
“humane and hospitable” land.277 Palencia made the role of Spain very clear in this matter; the 
only way for the Spanish Jews to reach America or Latin America was to “get on a boat from a 
Spanish port.”278 In this chain of logic follows the fact that these Jews needed visas to come to 
Spain. Palencia is equally candid throughout his correspondence about the “formalities of 
administrative origin” that issuing visas requires.279 As a result of such delayed responses by the 
Spanish government and the urgency of the circumstances, Palencia solicited Madrid to grant 
him a “certain elasticity in the concession of visas not important of their nationality or 
condition.”280  In this case, it appears that Palencia was trying to get visas for non-Spanish Jews 
and pushing the bounds of diplomatic jurisdiction.  
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Granting Visas 
In order to justify getting visas for Spanish Jews, Palencia argues that the protection of 
the Sephardim was inscribed in a historical context through Spanish laws, such as the Primo de 
Rivera law as discussed previously.  But Spanish protection of Ashkenazi Jews held no such 
historical precedent. However, Palencia also elevates the Spanish Jews in particular, saying “in 
Spain they were born the Ezras and Averos281…and in the Middle Ages they were the unique 
center of civilization and culture.”282 This idea of Spanish exceptionality and Spain’s historical 
memory of them is not unique to Palencia. But in this case, it seems that appealing to nationalism 
is a tactful means of legitimizing his actions towards the Jews. 
 Palencia appears to be exploiting the existence of national exceptionalize to help more 
Jews. He goes on to argue in his letter that the Spanish government should communicate to 
Berlin that the Spanish Jews “cannot be considered as herds destined to death” because to be 
Spanish is to be “something very superior to the incidents and fluctuations of German politics.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 Ironically, the name “Franco” is considered a Jewish name. Various historians have questioned whether 
Francisco Franco had Jewish blood or was secretly a converso and used his personal ties to Judaism as a reason for 
his aid to the Sephardim. However, this viewpoint has been widely discredited for it has never been substantiated 
and he may bare a quasi-Jewish name without being very Jewish due to the high rate of intermingling among 
Spaniards of varying ethnic and religious backgrounds throughout history.  
282 Letter: March 17, 1943, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival Research.  
126	  
283 In this way, a Spanish nationalist argues against German Nazism, two political ideologies that 
have often been lumped together as the same.   
Palencia also invokes policies of international law to defend his viewpoint on numerous 
occasions. In just one of these, on September 8, 1943, he wrote to Spain: “I dare to insinuate to 
Spain that …from the point of view of international law, to submit to its foreign subjects a law 
that of exception represents a political tendency that in our homeland doesn’t have for a moment 
existence nor reality one bit.” He goes so far as to say that the “the Bulgarians will be judged at 
the end of the war” and “will have to pay for it in time.”284 He expresses his personal revulsion at 
Bulgaria’s treatment of the Jews, adding “it would make me a liar to say that in the full twentieth 
century there can be such applications by a nation that says it is civilized.”285 
 Additionally, Palencia argues not only that the “the Spanish Jews do not deserve this 
treatment” but also that “Spain is obligated to protect them.”286 He tells Madrid that it would be 
“highly convenient” if Spain would indicate to Germany that “Spain doesn’t permit and will 
never permit, under any pretext, to have a child of theirs treated worse than an African Slave 
resigned to death.”287  In this case, it is unclear whether Palencia actually thinks so little of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 Ibid. 
284 Ibid. 
285 Letter: May 27, 1943, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival Research. 
286 Letter: March 17, 1943, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival Research. 
287 Letter: May 27, 1943, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival Research. 
127	  
Africans, or if he is exploiting racist ideas to his Jews’ advantage. It seems that Palencia may be 
exploiting others’ ideas of racial superiority, particularly the conception of racial superiority held 
by the Germans, to use German terms and logic as a rhetorical strategy to justify and manipulate 
his exploitation.                       
 
Adoption                      
Even more remarkable was Palencia’s adoption of Sephardic Jew and Bulgarian citizen 
Leon Arie’s family. Leon was executed for raising the price of perfume he sold by a few pennies, 
and Palencia came to the aid of his wife and children.288 Palencia acted through the Bulgarian 
courts to adopt Arie’s widow, Raquel Behar, and his two adolescent children, Cludy and Rene.289 
Without consulting anyone, he surprised his diplomatic colleagues when he freed the two 
individuals, provided them with diplomatic passports, and housed them in his own legation.290  
The Bulgarian legation transmitted numerous complaints to the Spanish Ministry, which 
foreign minister Jordana then expressed to Palencia himself.291 Palencia responded immediately, 
explaining,  
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[B]y following the advice of renowned attorneys, one of who is the ex minister of 
justice, I have adopted two children—seventeen and nineteen years old—children 
of the Sephardic Arie, condemned to death and whose sentence has been 
considered a general injustice and due entirely to his Jewish origin. As a result, it 
is inadmissible to say that the adoption on my part of these two minors belonging 
to a race the Bulgarian government has tried to make disappear from the country 
is an incorrect action.292  
In its reply, the Spanish ministry skirted the humanitarian issue at hand and instead 
focused on Palencia’s role as credible representative of Spain in Bulgaria and advised 
him to take actions that would not be opposed by the Bulgarian government.293	  
 
Julio Palencia’s Fate 
In the end, Palencia’s actions proved dangerous to his own life. The Spanish Sephardim 
in Bulgaria adored Palencia and viewed Don Julio (“Mr. Julio”), as they called him, as their only 
hope. The Nazis, however, saw in him a fanatic anti-German.294 He was finally named persona 
non grata,295 forced to leave Bulgaria and return to Madrid.296 Palencia’s actions represent a 
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crescendo of activity, far beyond the scope of his diplomatic duties, and enabled only by the 
diplomatic apparatus and his distance from Spain. But his violations also reveal where the 
bounds of diplomatic oversight are finally inviolable.  A certain level of personal involvement, 
some overly sympathetic speeches:  these the Spanish government could overlook, but not his 
adoption of a Jewish family.  With this action he moved far past the point of impunity. 
 Palencia and his adopted children left Sofia quickly and without saying good-bye to 
anyone, understanding the precarious situation the furious German delegation put them in. The 
Nazis told all of their delegations about this event and put them on alert, making Palencia and his 
adopted children “invalid” by German order.297 With the Gestapo “on his heels,”298 Palencia 
arrived in Madrid with his new children while Rachel Behar escaped to Romania, where she was 
protected as a Spanish national by the Turkish embassy.299 In the end, young Rene Arie Palencia 
died in a bombing in 1945.300 Cludy, after some time in Romania, escaped further instances of 
anti-Semitism and relocated permanently to Argentina until her death in 1982.301 Until all of 
their deaths, the entire Arie family never ceased publically proclaiming their deep love and 
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gratitude for Julio Palencia.302 Palencia himself died on March 25, 1952 at sixty-eight years 
old.303 According to scholar Martín de Pozuelo, “a punishment that still lasts is that his ministry 
is only remembered one time in the year 2000 and in December of 2011 he still has not been 
entered in the part of foreign affairs that speaks of its heroes.”304  Considering all that Palencia 
did for the Sephardim of Bulgaria, it is astonishing that he has received such little recognition for 
his actions.  
 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, the work of both Radigales in Greece and Palencia in Bulgaria demonstrate the 
bounds of power within Franco’s loose bureaucratic system and how geographical distance 
created greater opportunity for diplomatic insubordination. The actions of these diplomats, like 
the work of Bernardo Rolland in Paris, represent systematic efforts in different locations to help 
the Sephardim:  a group of Spaniards with whom these diplomats felt personal and historical ties 
to. 
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Conclusion: “Whosoever saves a single life saves an entire universe" 
                                                                                 (Mishnah, Sanhedrin 4:5) 
 
Recognizing Spanish Diplomatic Heroism 
Spain’s fascinating historical relations with the Sephardim coupled with diplomatic aid, 
as described in France, Greece, and Bulgaria during World War Two create a profoundly ironic 
paradigm. The complexities of the Franco regime’s alliances and political ideology make it 
virtually impossible to parse out the actual sentiments of Spain as a nation towards the 
Sephardim. Attempts by much of the literature on this subject to paint Spain as either “good” or 
“bad” is far too simplistic. Franco’s regime engaged with many other countries, trying to find the 
middle ground and not anger anyone too much in the process. In desperate times, Franco’s 
regime acted mostly out of self-interest as most other countries in its situation presumably would 
have done. The United States, for instance, also chose to act in its own self-interest: Roosevelt 
chose to concentrate on the war effort rather than bomb the railroads to Auschwitz or provide 
additional efforts towards halting the Holocaust.   
 However, due to the importance of self-interest in this matter it is crucial to consider the 
Spanish diplomats apart from the overall regime, for they based their actions on humanitarian 
motives. Besides the Spanish diplomats discussed in this paper, countless others have been 
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named as important figures in saving Jews. These figures include Casa Rojas in Romania, 
Frederico Olivan in Vienna, Giorgio Perlesca, J. Rives Childs, and most famously Angel Sanz 
Briz305 in Hungary.  
The question of individual versus systematic efforts on behalf of the Jews is something 
that distinguishes Spanish diplomats from diplomats of other countries in this era. Explanations 
for this activity stem from both an understanding of the importance of the Sephardim to Spain’s 
nationalistic self-definition, and from an awareness of the context in which Spanish diplomats 
operated: at a distance from Franco’s central government both literally and figuratively. 
Ultimately, the underlying irony – the very fact that Spanish diplomats aided Jews and yet 
Israeli-Spanish diplomatic relations prevented these very diplomats from being recognized – 
contributes to the overall irony that marks much of Spanish history.  
 
 
Rescued and Rescuers 
 
Looking back, Spanish citizenship was a godsend for many Spanish Jews, since many 
Spanish diplomats used the citizenship granted to the Sephardim in 1924 to save them from the 
perils of the Nazi Holocaust. Ultimately, the Spanish state’s history of shameful mistreatment of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 Consul general in Hungary who has been recognized by Yad Vashem’s “righteous among the nations” in 1965 
for issuing transit visas for over 1500 Jews. 
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the Sephardim might be one plausible explanation for the extensive aid Spanish diplomats 
provided for the Spanish Jews, whom they defended as they would regular Spanish citizens. 
These consuls drew upon the 1924 Primo de Rivera law to substantiate their claims of protecting 
“citizens” and their posts pre-dated Franco’s reign, which to some extent allowed them to act 
independently of his regime. In this way, many of these Spanish diplomats were not inherently 
part and parcel of the Franco regime and therefore did not share their leader’s ambivalent attitude 
and opportunistic approach. Instead, they maintained a consistent policy and they chose to help 
the Sephardim.  
The reasons why these Spanish diplomats acted in favor of the Jews is understudied in the 
current historiography and is difficult to explain fully. The workings of the bureaucratic system 
differed in the cases of Greece and Bulgaria, in comparison to France. The first two countries 
were located farther away from Spain, so Spanish diplomats there were afforded more freedoms 
to act independently of the Franco regime.   In France, a country bordering Spain, the Franco 
regime exercised tighter control over its diplomats, although some were still able to act contrary 
to the instructions they were given. In both the case of diplomacy at a distance from Spain and 
on the Spanish-French border, many aspects of bureaucratic structure help to explain why 
Spanish diplomats helped the Jews.  
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It is also possible that the Spanish diplomats connected with the Sephardim on an even 
deeper level regarding the question of identity. Diplomats often have a very strong identity 
connection with each other.  They often have more in common with each other as diplomats than 
with other “French” or “Spanish” citizens. This distinction sets diplomats as a “nation apart,” or 
a group of individuals whose chosen profession explicitly requires them to wander the world.  
Perhaps this contributes to a fundamental connection with Jews.  Throughout history Jews have 
been seen as a “nation apart” or a “nation within a nation.” They have had ties to another, foreign 
homeland—namely Israel.  Both diplomats and Jews maintain a cultural connection to their new 
home but are still somehow “others” in an intangible sense. It is possible that this similar identity 
and emphasis on wandering allowed these particular Spanish diplomats to feel a certain sense of 
empathy towards the Sephardim.  They were culturally the closest to the diplomats wherever 
they arrived.  Such an ephemeral connection may explain some of their extraordinarily 
humanitarian actions, sometimes undertaken at personal risk.  
The actions taken by Spanish diplomats abroad during World War Two are directly 
connected to the independence of the Spanish diplomatic corps from Franco. It is obvious that 
Franco did not establish a clear agenda for his diplomats or an institutionalized training system 
prior to 1942. Additionally, these diplomats did not have the confidence of the Franco regime, 
and it appears that Franco was cognizant of the fact that his diplomats acted however they saw 
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fit. Some of these diplomats may have actively chosen to work in opposition to the France 
regime because of their political differences while others may have worked against their 
government purely because they were doing what they thought was morally right.  
Overall, it is clear that the Spanish Civil War had a profound impact on the Spanish 
diplomatic corps. The 1942 establishment of the institutionalized training system of the 
diplomatic corps was Franco’s attempt to correct this problem and create a ranking of diplomats 
that was an extension of his regime with the same ideological leanings.  
These suggestions are possible answers to the historical puzzle of Spanish help to Jewish 
refugees in World War Two. Beyond providing ways to comprehend an important and relatively 
unacknowledged aspect of Holocaust history, this work calls attention to the importance of 
recognizing contingency and competing interests in historiography.  Additionally, it brings to 
light questions of recognition and why certain people are remembered while others aren’t. 
 Part of the reason for Yad Vashem’s lack of recognition for these diplomats can be 
attributed to the lens of historiography and the questions of why and how Spain’s role was 
commemorated in the way it was. On one hand, in the wake of World War Two, Spain became 
an isolated country, almost a pariah, to much of the Western world. The Western democracies 
associated Spain with the frightening “f” word, fascism, a political ideology shared by Hitler and 
his followers, allies, and supporters who started World War Two.  Franco, in the eyes of Western 
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democracy, Spain was Hitler’s former ally, which could therefore not be trusted.  On the other 
hand, Spain was quick to overstate the extent of its aid to the Jews through an extensive 
propaganda campaign in an effort to rewrite Spain’s war record for the rest of the world. The 
creation of this myth, the exaggerated and false impression of Spain’s sense of humanitarian 
action, was propagated by the spread of pamphlets and packets. For instance, one called España 
y los judíos 306 intended to show the “truth” about Spain’s role during the Holocaust.307 
Additionally, Spain attempted to cultivate some important Jewish leaders and having meetings 
with the World Jewish Congress.308  So by exaggerating claims plus bearing the stigma of 
fascism, the Spanish lost credibility.  Despite the fact that Spain could have undoubtedly saved 
many more Jews, Spain hoped to rewrite its history to “show the exemplar politics of Franco to 
the democratic world.”309 According to Martínez Reverte in the Madrileño newspaper El País 
article La lista de Franco para el Holocausto published in 2010, “at the end of World War Two, 
Franco’s regime tried with relative success to confuse the world’s public opinion with the fable 
that he had contributed to the salvation of thousands of Jews from the eager Nazi 	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of Jewish communities and organizations. Its main purpose is to act as "the diplomatic arm of the Jewish people." 
Membership in the WJC is open to all representative Jewish communities regardless of the social, political or 
economic ideology of their host country. The official headquarters are in New York City. 
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exterminators.”310  This effort was largely unsuccessful due to the fact that many people were 
critical of diplomats’ actual efforts because they are now seen as tainted or indistinguishable 
from this blatant propaganda. Regardless, the Israeli former Prime Minister Golda Meir311 once 
said to the Spanish magazine Epoca that Israel was appreciative of "the humanitarian attitude 
taken by Spain during the Hitler era, when it gave aid and protection to any victims of 
Nazism.”312              
 Despite this statement by Golda Meir, according to Diego Carcedo, the lack of public 
knowledge about the actions taken by Spanish officials in Budapest and the lack of diplomatic 
relations between Spain and Hungary and Spain and Israel “impeded those who received in their 
lifetime some sort of recognition and homages that they later received; he [Ángel Sanz Briz] was 
named “Righteous Among the Nations” by Yad Vashem.”313 Thus, it appears that this distortion 
of history contributed to Israel’s view of Spain and Yad Vashem’s slow pace at recognizing 
Spanish individuals and diplomats’ efforts during World War Two. At the same time, however, 	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mundial con la fábula de que había contribuido a la salvación de miles de judíos del afán exterminador nazi”: Jorge 
Martínez Reverte,  “La lista de Franco para el Holocausto” (Madrid: El País), 20-06-2010.  
311 The fourth Prime Minister of Israel on March 17, 1969.  
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España y Hungría y España e Israel impidió que recibiese en vida alguno de los reconocimientos y homenajes que 
mas tarde le llevaron; fue declarado justo entre las naciones por el Yad Vashem”: Carcedo, Entre bestias y héroes, 
210. 
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Spain is also guilty of revisionism. The official history that many Spaniards learned in college 
for the period of 1939 until Franco’s death in 1975 was skewed by historians to include the pro-
Semitic and enlightened “salvation” that Spain provided to the Jews during World War Two.314 
These propagandistic “lies” were created by the destruction of documents that proved that Spain 
collaborated with the Nazis, and also by “historical myopia” in which Franco changed the facts 
regarding Spanish intervention taken by diplomatic intervention against the orders of the dictator 
himself.315  
 
Spain and Israel’s Relations Post-World War Two 
Spain’s revisionism in conjunction with modern diplomatic conflicts between Israel and 
Spain are probably the two main causes of the lack of Spanish diplomatic recognition.   Perhaps 
the stage for these problems was set from the very inception of the state of Israel, when 
telegrams announcing its establishment were specifically not sent to Spain (along with Germany 
and Arab nations).316 In fact, Spain was the last European country to recognize the state of Israel 
and went through an extended process of normalization, interchange of political visits, and 
intensification of cultural, historical, and scientific relations before official recognition 	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occurred.317  Not until January 17, 1986 did diplomatic ties between Madrid and Jerusalem 
become official, restoring the historical link between Spain and the Jews.318  
In the early argument about recognizing the Spanish government, Israeli diplomatic 
officials weighed two principles, discussion of which may clarify the lack of recognition that 
came from the Israeli side.  The first was Spain’s treatment of the Jews.  According to Shlomo 
Kedar, First Secretary in Israel’s Paris embassy,  
The year 1492 indeed remains a shameful blot on the pages of Spanish history, 
but at the same time it does not seem to me good political sense to nurse a grudge 
forever. If Israel wanted to maintain relations only with those states, which, 
throughout their histories, had never persecuted Jews, I doubt that any could be 
found, except perhaps those where Jews have never lived.319  
Kedar bolstered his argument by recalling some individual Spaniards’ assistance in saving Jews 
during the war.320  Kedar also considered the second principle: that Spain should not be 
recognized by Israel due to the nature of Franco’s regime.  In Kedar’s view, as personally 
repellent as an absolutist regime might be to him, “it is an internal matter in every state to 
establish the regime it wants.”321 Thus, it is important to acknowledge that not all Spaniards 
wanted the Franco regime in Spain in the first place as it only came to power after a brutal civil 
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war. Ultimately, Kedar concluded that Israel should recognize Spain, but in 1950, when this 
debate was still in its infancy, such reasoning was powerless to change policy.  Only in 
succeeding years did the thinking in Israel’s Foreign Ministry change subtly, as “members of the 
lower echelons of diplomacy—from secretaries and envoys to ambassadors and division heads—
began to exert pressure on the Ministry’s senior officials.”322    
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Israel’s ambassador to the U.N., Abba Eban323 overtly detailed the reasons for Israel’s 
hostility towards Spain and why Israel was against Spain’s admittance to the U.N. in May of 
1949, saying that “the United Nations arose out of the sufferings of a martyred generation…we 
do not for a moment assert that the Spanish regime had any direct part in that policy of 
extermination; but we do assert that it was an active and sympathetic ally of the regime which 
was so responsible and thus contributed to the effectiveness of the alliance as a whole.”324 This 
stance would serve as the model for Israel’s attitude towards Spain for many years to come. At 
the same time, it appears that Spain wanted to relieve itself from this legacy but without having 
to recognize Israel. 
Leading up to the vote regarding Spain’s admittance to the U.N., Israel received 
numerous telegrams from Sephardic Jewish communities from around the world and Jewish 
communities in Spanish Morocco requesting that Israel vote in favor of Franco’s regime.325 
These appeals were popular between the years 1949-1959, even without the pending vote, 
whereby Sephardic communities continuously called for a change in Israel’s policy towards 
Madrid.  Overall, the Spanish ministry was very pleased by the devotion and sense of patriotism 
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shown by the Sephardim.326 Perhaps however, Israel categorically rejected these appeals and 
voted against Spain joining the U.N.327 Allegedly, Franco felt personally offended by Israel’s 
“no” vote and by the fact that Israel associated him with Hitler.328  In fact, many Jews within 
Spain feared that Israel’s vote would result in Franco’s hostile retaliation against them, but these 
fears proved unfounded due to Spain’s obsession with its international image.329  Thus, the main 
impact of Israel’s vote against Spain was the prevailing attitude in Spain that Israel had returned 
Spain’s help to the Jews with ingratitude.330  
It was not until Franco’s death in 1975 that a change in Israeli-Spanish relations became 
possible; diplomatic relations were officially established in 1986.331 In 1998, the Institute of 
Cervantes was inaugurated in Tel Aviv and in a crowning moment, Spanish King Juan Carlos I 
and Queen Sofia paid homage to the victims of the Holocaust on a November 8, 1993 visit to 
Yad Vashem.332 This rapprochement ultimately resulted in increased recognition for the 
humanitarian work of Spanish diplomats during the Holocaust. Today, while Spanish diplomats 
still lack popular recognition and are not household names in the way that saviors of other 	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nationalities are, their role is slowly but surely gaining recognition many years after the 
Holocaust. As recently as December 17, 2010, Spain became a member of the Task Force of 
International Cooperation for Education, Memory and Investigation of the Holocaust, known for 
decades as the International Task Force.   
The Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, 
and Research is an “intergovernmental body whose purpose is to place political and social 
leaders' support behind the need for Holocaust education, remembrance, and research both 
nationally and internationally.”333 Their mission is to “remember the victims who perished, 
respect the survivors still with us, and reaffirm humanity's common aspiration for mutual 
understanding and justice.”334 In Spain, this group works to name those Spanish individuals who 
helped Jews escape the Holocaust, with the underlying objective “to raise testimony and 
recuperate part of the collective historical memory.”335  
 
Modern Day Reconciliation? 
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This complex modern day relationship between Israel and Spain has not had a negative 
impact on Spanish-Sephardic relationships. Recently, Spain extended citizenship to Jews of 
Sephardic descent. According to New York Times article “Citizenship Process Eased for 
Sephardic Jews” dated November 22, 2012 by Raphael Minder,  
Spain is now granting citizenship automatically without any residency 
requirement to those who can demonstrate descent from those Jews expelled from 
Spain more than 500 years ago….This reform will affect those who are able to 
prove their Sephardic condition, whether it is via surnames, language, 
descendants or links to Spanish culture and Spanish customs. 
Again, this preference to Jews may be described as a past remedy for injustice since it appears to 
be atonement for a shameful past. This citizenship is not granted to just any Jews, only Jews of 
Spanish heritage. However it is equally possible that this policy has self-serving motives. In this 
case, this extension of citizenship may possibly be linked to Spain’s severe economic recession, 
because they hope that the Sephardim returning to Spain could help the economy. It is 
additionally peculiar because Spain’s expelled Muslims do not have a "right to return" to Spain.  
 However, an article titled “A Tepid ‘Welcome Back’ for Spanish Jews” published in The 
New York Times on December 8, 2012, disputes the legitimacy of this “remedy.”  Doreen 
Caravjal, the author of this piece, and herself a descendent of a Jew of clandestine Sephardic 
identity, argues that the improved process of nationalization for Sephardic Jews is more 
complicated that it initially appears. According to this article, “Spain’s foreign minister José 
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Manuel García-Margallo sought to address his nation’s painful legacy when he revealed the 
reforms, declaring it was time ‘to recover Spain’s silenced memory.’”336 While some Sephardic 
communities, such as the Federation of Sephardic Jews in Argentina, were very pleased by 
Spain’s new legislation, others, such as Genie Milgrom, who is president of the Jewish 
Genealogical Association, have no interest in capitalizing on Spain’s offer.337 In Milgrom’s 
view, Spain is a country that “extinguished” her heritage.”338  
In Caravjal’s opinion, for such purportedly lofty aspirations, this “recovery” seems to be 
filled with complicated intricacies and procedures that do not speak so much to a reconciliatory 
nature. For instance, anousim339 or crypto–Jews who lived a double life of Judaism in the guise 
of converting to Catholicism, must go through a complex naturalization process.340 The criterion 
for this process requires such applicants to have a formal conversion to Judaism for Sephardim 
who are interested in gaining citizenship.341 While this is an improvement from previous 
citizenship standards since it eliminates a residency requirement that was based on a subjective 	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standard of financial credibility and renouncing alternative citizenships, according to Carvajal 
the Sephardim are once again being required by Spain to make commitments and forcibly 
convert – this time back to Judaism. In this way, for many modern day Sephardim “gratitude 
turned to gloom” when considering Spain’s new legislation aimed at correcting a centuries-old 
historical wrong.342 The fundamental opinion of many of these Sephardim can be best summed 
up in the words of Michael Freund, creator of the Jerusalem-based Shavei Foundation for the 
descendants of anousim, “This is an outrage, and it goes against the spirit of reconciliation which 
the Spanish government claims to cherish. How sad that instead of utilizing this opportunity to 
send an unequivocal message of contrition, Spain is choosing to heap further insult on injury.”343   
Thus, not all Sephardim are pleased with Spain’s renewed citizenship offers as a means to 
compensate for its past.  
The question of citizenship draws attention to the “half diaspora” that characterizes some 
Sephardim. During World War Two, Spain was willing to let these Spanish Jews enter Spain but 
only for a period of thirty days. This action was simultaneously problematic and remarkable. No, 
Spaniard and Jew were not completely irreconcilable categories. But at the same time these 
Spaniards were Jews. They still remained different, a people apart who could thus could not stay 
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in Spain. Now, Spain is once again extending citizenship and inviting the Sephardim back to 
Spain – this time to stay. But the idea of the “half diaspora” that defines these Jews manifests 
itself in the negative reaction of many Sephardim to Spain’s offer. While they value their 
Spanish roots and heritage, many still do not feel welcome in Spain.   
 
Recognition  
 In light of the Spanish-Israeli diplomatic relations and modern day offers of citizenship, 
the question of recognition is an intriguing one. In 1962, Yad Vashem344 established a 
commission to designate a “righteous public agency” to recognize non-Jewish rescuers of Jews 
during the Holocaust.345 The gravity of this task was poetically described by Elie Wiesel,346 
"And so we must know these good people who helped Jews during the Holocaust. We must learn 
from them, and in gratitude and hope, we must remember them.”347  
Ultimately, these rescuers, whatever their motivations, deserve recognition for their roles 
in saving thousands of Jews, Sephardic and Ashkenazi alike.  At Yad Vashem, the “Heroes’ 	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imparts meaning for future generations. Established in 1953, as the world center for documentation, research, 
education and commemoration of the Holocaust, Yad Vashem is today a dynamic and vital place of 
intergenerational and international encounter. Yad Vashem website, yadvashem.org.  
345 Paldiel, Diplomat heroes of the Holocaust, 3. 
346 Romanian-born Jewish-American writer, professor, political activist, Nobel Laureate, and Holocaust survivor.  
347 http://db.yadvashem.org/righteous/search.html?language=en 
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Remembrance Authority” attempts to list for posterity the names of the “Righteous among 
Nations”:  
a unique and unprecedented attempt by the victims to honor individuals from 
within the nations of perpetrators, collaborators and bystanders, who stood by the 
victims' side and acted in stark contrast to the mainstream of indifference and 
hostility that prevailed in the darkest time of history.348  
The official requirement for such recognition is generally based on the rescuer risking his life 
when providing assistance.  For diplomats in particular, it is necessary to demonstrate that they 
acted “either in violation of clear instructions or in a way against the spirit of their 
instructions.”349 Among the Righteous listed on the Yad Vashem website are 1612 Belgians, 831 
Lithuanians, 6339 Poles—and 6 Spaniards.  None of the diplomats I discussed previously are on 
that list (see figure 19). The particular language relating to diplomats is admittedly tricky since it 
is possible that Spanish diplomats were taking advantage of the ambiguity and holes in their 
instructions rather than explicitly violating them or risking their lives. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 Ibid. 
349 Ibid. 
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Statistics: Numbers of Individuals Recognized by Yad Vashem by Country 
• Poland: 6,339 
• Netherlands: 5,204 
• France: 3,513 
• Italy: 524 
• Greece: 313 
• Bulgaria: 20 
• Spain: 6 
 
Yad Vashem Spanish Recognized “Righteous Among the Nations”  
 
By 1 January 2012 
SPAIN 
NAME                                   YEAR 
Aguirre y Otegui, Martin   2011 
Faya Blasquez, Conception   2011 
       Propper de Callejon, Eduardo         2007 
            Santaella, Dr. Jose & Carmen         1988 
                                           Sanz Briz, Angel            1965 
	  
Figure 19. Source: yadvashem.org 350 
The recent timing of the majority of these recognitions and their scarcity are particularly 
intriguing based on the fact that countries, such as the Netherlands, have thousands of individuals 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 Ibid. 
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on this list.351  It is unlikely that in a country where such a large-scale efforts to help the 
Sephardim took place, which undeniably took place in Spain, that only seven individuals meet 
the criterion set forth by Yad Vashem. Perhaps we will never know all of the individuals who 
aided Jews during this era, especially as it becomes more of a distant past and part of historical 
memory. Yet the fact that people are still just being recognized gives hope that more people will 
come forward and more people will be recognized for their incredibly brave actions.  
 
Conclusion 
 Ultimately, this story comes full circle.  In thinking about why Spanish diplomatic 
heroes have not been accorded the highest recognition in Israeli collective memory, we 
encounter again the narrative of the Sephardic Diaspora, which is pitted against the critique of 
Franco’s fascism.  We also find repeated, in a different register, the same attention to the 
bureaucratic nature of a diplomatic corps.  Just as Spanish diplomats operated at a distance from 
Franco’s central government, both literally and figuratively, gaps in the hierarchy of authority 
and resulting space for individual action was mirrored in the process by which Israeli-Spanish 
diplomatic relations were eventually established.  Ironically, it was diplomacy—or the lack 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 5,204 Danish individuals have been given this honor. Perhaps the most famous of these people are Victor Kugler, 
Johannes Kleiman, Miep Gies, and Bep Voskuijl, the individuals who hid Anne Frank’s family in Amsterdam before 
their discovery and subsequent deportation to Auschwitz on August 4, 1944.  
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thereof—that contributed to Yad Vashem’s slow pace in recognizing the saving efforts of 
Spanish diplomats during World War Two. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Chapter 3 Timeline:  France 
 
1862:  On January 7, a French-Spanish agreement was reached regarding the rights and mutual 
protection of interests of citizens of both countries.  
 
1924: Spain issued a decree that considered the Sephardim as Spaniards.  
 
1939: Bernardo Rolland of Miota began his term as Consul General in Paris.  
 
1940: 
 
-On June 22, France and its allies were defeated in the Battle of France and signed an armistice 
with Germany. 
 
-On October 8, Madrid issued a decree which prevented Spanish consuls from granting transit 
visas without first sending all requests by telegraph to Spain.  
 
1941: In August, Rolland appealed to the Spanish embassy and actively intervened in favor of 
Spanish nationals to remove them from the Drancy internment camp 
 
1942: 
 
-In June, Palencia began to describe measures taken against the Jews, such as the fact that they 
were prohibited from saluting to the Bulgarian flag and owning businesses.  
 
-In August, the U.S. Embassy in Madrid obtained a guarantee from the Spanish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs that no illegal refugees, namely Jews, would be returned to their country against 
their will 
 
-Rolland successfully made it impossible for Vichy authorities to confiscate the Sephardim’s 
property.  
 
-Spanish-French border closed towards the end of 1942.  
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1943:  
 
-In February, the Spanish consul in Marseille ignored Madrid’s orders and required that label 
juif be removed from Jewish clothing. 
 
-In mid 1943, Bernardo Rolland of Miota finished his term of Consul General in Paris. 
 
-In September, despite Germany’s pressures, Spain evacuated French citizens (some of who 
were Jews) from the coast of Cadiz, Algeciras and Malaga 
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Chapter 4 Timeline:  Greece 
 
1912:  
 
-Greeks conquered the city of Salonika and overtly targeted the Jews. Spain reached an 
agreement with the Greeks in April of 1915 to provide conservative aid for the Sephardim 
residing there.  
 
-The Spanish Empire established the Spanish protectorate of Morocco under colonial rule by the 
Treaty of Fez until 1956 when both France and Spain recognized Moroccan independence.  
 
1935-1936: Spain revealed its “pro-Jewish sympathies” to a certain extent when it signed 
agreements with Egypt (1935) and Greece (1936). 
 
1941: The Nazis officially occupied Greece, which greatly impacted the fate of the Sephardim 
residing there.  
 
1943: 
 
-In March the Germans began deporting Jews in Greece but made an exception for foreign 
nations, such as Spanish Jews holding a valid Spanish passport 
 
-In mid April the new consul general Sebastian Romero Radigales took over in Athens 
 
-The Germans issued an ultimatum on April 30th that had a timeline of six months. It suggested 
the repatriation of citizen Jews before the 15th of June of 1943, as there would be an “increase in 
the general actions against the Jews in the zone of Salonika” (Martín de Pozuelo, 100).   
 
-On July 16th, the Spanish embassy in Berlin telegraphed the German ambassador to the legation 
of Athens with new instructions rejecting the repatriation of Spanish Jews except for in special 
cases 
 
-On July 29th, the Germans transported 367 Spanish Jews of Salonika to a local ghetto to await 
shipment to Bergen-Belsen 
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-In October of 1943, 155 Spanish Jews in Athens were arrested and deported despite Radigales’ 
protests 
 
1944:  On March 24th, Radigales unsuccessfully tried to release 350 arrested Greek Jews in 
Bergen-Belsen.  
 
1946:  Franco sought admission to the U.N. and Israel played a crucial role in its veto abilities to 
deny Spain admission from this institution and subsequently from receiving aid from the 
Marshall plan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 Timeline:  Bulgaria 
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1940: 
 
-Julio Palencia became the Spanish minister in Sofia. 
 
-In December, Bulgaria approved a wide anti-Semitism legislation 
 
1941: Bulgaria agreed to be complaint with the Nazis so that Hitler could bring his troops en 
route to offensives against both Yugoslavia and Greece. 
 
1942:  The Germans offered an ultimatum in July stating that the Jews  
Shortly following these laws; Jews who did not abandon the country by September 1st would be 
subjected to the same conditions as the Bulgarian Jews 
 
1943: Julio Palencia ended his term as Spanish minister in Sofia and was declared persona non 
grata in Bulgaria and forced to flee.  
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